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Abstract 
 
In this dissertation, we first examine the relationship between performance of the bank 
holding company and several board characteristics.  We use five proxies for bank performance 
including Tobin’s Q, ROA, loan loss reserve ratio, non-performing asset ratio, and net charge-
offs ratio.  Board characteristic variables we include are board size, proportion of outsiders, CEO 
power, CEO tenure and board tenure.  We find that a large board enhances bank performance, as 
proxied by Tobin’s Q and loan quality variables.  We find no evidence that board structure or 
CEO power influences firm performance.  We see that CEO and board tenure have a positive 
effect on firm performance.  We further employ a crisis dummy during the period 2007 through 
2009 to determine if the relationships between firm performance and board characteristics 
changed during the crisis.  Our crisis results show us that board size has a negative effect on 
Tobin’s Q and the non-performing asset ratio during the crisis.  Further, we find that board 
structure decreases the non-performing asset ratio during the crisis. 
We next examine the relationship between risk-taking of the bank holding company and 
several board characteristics.  We use four accounting based proxies for bank risk-taking 
including credit risk, liquidity risk, capital ratio and operational risk.  We also use three market 
based proxies for bank risk including market beta, idiosyncratic risk and the standard deviation 
of its stock return.  Board characteristic variables we include are board size, board independence, 
CEO duality, CEO tenure and board tenure.  We find that a large board reduces both balance 
sheet and market risk.  We further investigate the relationships between risk-taking and board 
characteristics changed during the financial crisis of 2007-2009.  We find that our results are 
robust during the crisis. 
KEYWORDS:  bank performance, bank risk-taking, board characteristics, board of directors 
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Chapter 1 
 
The Relationship between Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: 
Evidence from Bank Holding Companies 
 
I. Introduction 
 Regulators and the board of directors failed to monitors banks during the most recent 
financial crisis.  The world came close to a financial meltdown, which led to a U.S. government 
bailout.  The blame of this crisis was given to credit default swaps, however, at the heart of these 
contracts were mortgages.  Had the board paid more attention to the banks’ loan quality, perhaps 
the banking system we would not have had the extreme situation we faced.  In this paper, we 
examine the relationship between BHC board characteristics and firm performance.  We proxy 
firm performance as other papers have using Tobin’s Q and ROA.  However, we also use the 
several loan quality variables to proxy firm performance, following Grove et al. (2009), which 
include loss reserve ratio, non-performing assets ratio and net charge-offs ratio.  There are 
numerous implications of this paper.  Regulators may be able to use the results of this paper to 
relax or set new rules on boards based on our results.  BHCs may see the results of this paper and 
change their board characteristics to increase firm performance.  The goal of our research is the 
same as that of regulators and BHC boards, to prevent future financial crises.    
 According to Mehran et al. (2011), the corporate governance of banks is different from 
that of nonfinancial firms for two reasons.  First is that banks have many more stakeholders; 
second is that the business of banks is opaque and complex.  Previous literature on corporate 
governance has primarily focused on non-financial firms and excludes regulated industries, i.e. 
the banking industry.  However, this is one of the most important industries to examine.  As we 
have seen in recent years, failure of the board to monitor bank activities may result in a bank’s 
failure, and multiple or very large bank failures may lead to systemic problems or even a 
financial system crisis.  Although the U.S. has a strong regulatory structure to prevent crises, it 
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did not prevent the recent crisis.  A better understanding of the board’s role in bank governance 
may help policy makers to establish a more stable financial environment and a less costly 
regulatory structure.  Better internal monitoring of banks by their boards of directors may lessen 
the need for external monitoring by regulators.  
 The number of parties with a stake in an institution’s activity complicates the governance 
of the bank.  Not only investors, but depositors and regulators have a direct interest in bank 
performance.  Depositors are concerned with the stability of the bank because their money is 
being held and used by the bank.  If the bank fails, the depositor is protected by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) from a loss of up to $250,000.  However, depositors with 
more than $250,000 in the bank may lose money and thus worry about the bank’s stability.  
Regulators are concerned with the effect governance has on the performance of banks because 
the health of the economy at the end depends on their performance.  As we saw during the recent 
financial crisis, a failure of one bank could cause a chain reaction to other banks.  Therefore, it is 
important to study the governance of banks and how it differs from non-financial firms.   
 Bank board structure may be constrained due to regulations.  The board of a national 
bank, as stipulated by the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC), must consist of at least 
five, but no more than twenty-five board members.  This upper limit is not binding, however, 
because the OCC can exempt the bank from this limit.  Each state member bank, which is 
supervised by the Federal Reserve, is required to have a board.  Board size is regulated 
separately; different states may have requirements on the board composition of the bank.  For 
example, New York’s state regulation requires two-thirds of the directors on the board to be 
outsiders (NY State Banking Laws, Article 15, Title 7).   
 Again, the purpose of our paper is to examine the relationship between board size, board 
composition, CEO power, CEO tenure, board tenure and firm performance.  We extend the 
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Adams and Mehran (2008), Andres and Vallelado (2008), and Belkhir (2009) papers to include 
much more recent data and larger samples.  Consistent with previous studies in governance, our 
main proxies of bank performance are Tobin’s Q and ROA.  We use additional proxies of bank 
performance following Grove et al. (2009 and 2011); these include loan loss reserve ratio 
(LLRR), non-performing asset ratio (NPAR) and net charge-offs ratio (NCOR).  Another 
contribution of this paper is that we examine how the bank performance is affected during the 
financial crisis by corporate governance variables. 
 Our data has a panel structure.  We choose the largest 150 banks in 1999 and then follow 
them all the way to 2009; thus, a firm and year fixed effect model fits our data best.  The BHCs 
in our sample have an average board size of 14 members, with an average of 78.4% outsiders, 
and 60% of the BHC’s CEOs also Chairman.  The CEO has been on the board an average of 12.3 
years, and the board of directors has an average tenure of 9.8 years.  We find a positive 
relationship between board size and Tobin’s Q and ROA.  We find a negative relationship 
between board size and LLRR, NPAR and NCOR, while we find a positive relationship between 
board tenure and Tobin’s Q and CEO tenure and ROA.  Interestingly, we find a negative 
relationship between CEO tenure and NCOR. 
 During the financial crisis, first we see a negative relationship between board size and 
Tobin’s Q; we also see a negative relationship between board size and NPAR.  In addition, we 
see that NPAR increases as the proportion of insiders increases on the board.  Thus, there is a 
negative relationship between the proportion of outsiders and NPAR. 
 The paper is presented as follows.  The next section will discuss previous literature and 
develop the hypotheses.  Section 3 will discuss data methodology with the following section 
discussing results.  Section 5 will conclude.  
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II. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 The effectiveness of boards of directors has been shown to depend on the board’s size.  
Early studies by Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) propose that large boards are 
ineffective.  Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue that the benefits of a large board are outweighed by 
the costs of slower decision making, less candid discussions of managerial performance and 
biases against risk taking.  Further, Jensen (1993) states that large boards are less likely to 
function effectively and are easier for the CEO to control.  Both of these studies also contend that 
as the board of directors get bigger, they become less effective because free-riding problems 
erupt and decisions will be harder to make in a timely manner.  Many studies have tested this 
view empirically.  Yermack (1996), Barnhart and Rosenstein (1998), Eisenberg et al. (1998), 
Bhagat and Black (2002), and Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) test the relationship between board 
size and firm performance; using only industrial firms in their samples, they find an inverse 
relationship between board size and firm performance.  They use two proxies for firm 
performance, Tobin’s Q and ROA.   
  Booth et al. (2002), Adams and Mehran (2003) and Hayes et al. (2005) find that banks 
have larger boards than their non-financial counterparts.  Several studies theorized that CEOs of 
complex, opaque firms may need more advice on their many segments and more board members 
offer experience and expertise.  (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Yermack, 1996; Dalton et al. 
1999)  Adams and Mehran (2003) suggest three reasons that BHCs have bigger boards.  First, 
there is a positive relationship between board size and asset size.  Also, larger, diversified firms 
might need additional board members to help monitor management.  Finally, mergers and 
acquisitions within the industry may have resulted in banks having larger boards.   
 Bank board effectiveness has been examined over the last few years.  Studies such as 
Andres and Vallelado (2008), Coles et al. (2008), Adams and Mehran (2008) and Belkhir (2009) 
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find that larger boards perform better using Tobin’s Q and ROA as proxies for firm performance.    
A different approach by Grove et al. (2009) uses several loan quality variables as proxies for 
firm performance.  They find no relationship between board size and firm performance.  A 
second study by Grove et al. (2011) using a larger sample finds that board size has a concave 
relationship to ROA and a negative relationship between board size and the non-performing asset 
ratio.  A study by Pathan et al. (2011) uses a much larger sample that the previous studies and 
finds a negative relationship between board size and firm performance using Tobin’s Q and ROA 
as proxies for firm performance.  Since there is no consensus in the previous literature how board 
size will affect firm performance, we must hypothesize the null, which is that the board size has 
no effect on firm performance. 
 Hypothesis 1:  Board size has no effect on BHC performance. 
 Many studies have examined the relationship between board composition and firm 
performance in industrial firms, but there is no consensus in the literature.  MacAvoy et al. 
(1983), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Mehran (1995), Yermack (1996), Klein (1998), Bhagat 
and Black (2002), and Francis et al. (2012)  all find no relationship between firm performance 
and the proportion of outside directors.  On the other hand, Baysinger and Butler (1985) find 
evidence that companies perform better if boards have more outsiders.  However, one problem 
with their study is that they find that outsider composition affects the company’s return on equity 
ten years later.  A ten year lag may be too long for the effects of board composition to be 
revealed in firm performance without confounding influences.  Pearce and Zahra (1992) find that 
the proportion of outsiders increases firm performance.  Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) find a 
negative relationship between the proportion of outside directors and Tobin’s Q.    Bhagat and 
Bolton (2008) find a negative relationship between board independence and future firm operating 
performance.   
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 Pfeffer (1972) argues that highly regulated firms, i.e. the banking industry, have fewer 
insiders on their boards.  Brickley and James (1987) pioneered the work on board composition in 
the banking industry.  They argue that the market for takeovers and boards of directors are 
substitute devices for controlling managers; this implies that more independent boards, i.e. 
outsider dominated boards, will emerge where the market for takeovers is weakest.  However, 
they find, going against their expectations, that the proportion of outsiders is greatest for banks 
operating in states that allow acquisitions.  Agrawal and Knoeber (2000) argue that firms 
sensitive to political decisions (proxied either by the percentage of sales to the government or by 
the presence of a public relations office in Washington, D.C.) have more independent directors 
with political backgrounds.  Based on these studies, because banks are highly regulated and are 
sensitive to political decisions, there should be few insiders and more outsiders on their boards.  
 Fama and Jensen (1983), Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) and Linck et al. (2008) argue 
that banks with high information asymmetry may benefit from more insiders on their boards.  
However, they also argue that independent directors are better monitors of bank management 
than insiders and can be valuable due to their experience, expertise and connections.   
 Researchers have not found consistent results in the banking industry either.  Adams and 
Mehran (2008), Belkhir (2009) and Grove et al. (2011) find no relationship between board 
structure and firm performance.  Grove et al. (2009) results indicate that a high proportion of 
insiders on the board is a sign of weak corporate governance and is associated with poor loan 
quality.  Andres and Vallelado (2008) find that firms perform better if they have more outsiders.  
Since there is no definitive answer as to the relationship between outsiders on the board and firm 
performance, we have to assume the null and hypothesize that there is no relationship between 
the proportion of outsiders and firm performance. 
 Hypothesis 2:  Board structure has no effect on BHC performance. 
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 CEOs are often also chairmen of their boards of directors.  Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1998) and Linck et al. (2008) find that a CEO gains power when they become chairman of the 
board.  Daily and Schwenk (1996) believe that CEO power hinders the board’s decision making.  
Solomon (1993) says that the CEO can control the flow of information and the board’s agenda 
when duality is present.  Pi and Timme (1993) find that the firm’s return on assets decreases 
when the CEO is also chairman.  Yermack (1996) and Larcker et al. (2007) contend that the 
CEO who is also chairman reduces the independence of the board and is an indicator of weak 
corporate governance.  Dechow et al. (1996) find that firms that manipulate earnings are more 
likely to have a CEO that is also chairman.  Goyal and Park (2002) discover that the CEO that is 
chairman is less likely to lose their job due to poor performance.  Another study by Bhagat and 
Bolton (2008) find a negative relationship between CEO power and future operating 
performance.  Thus, it seems that it is not a good thing to have a CEO that is also a chairman. 
 However, Andersen and Anthony (1996), argue that decisions can be made faster because 
the board meetings are better focused on objectives and operations.  A couple studies have 
empirically tested the relationship, but none of these found any evidence, i.e. Kiel and Nicholson 
(2003), Abdullah (2004), Weir and Liang (2000), and Adams et al. (2005).  Tian and Lau (2001) 
find a positive relationship between firm performance and CEO power for Chinese-listed 
companies.  Moreover, a study by Kaymak and Bektas (2008) on Turkish banks find a negative 
relationship between firm performance and CEO power.  Conversely, find that CEO power has 
no effect on firm performance.  Van Ness et al. (2010) theorizes that the CEO with power is an 
advocate for shareholders which leads to better firm performance; they empirically prove this 
positive relationship between CEO power and firm performance.  There is no consensus in the 
literature regarding CEO power’s relationship with firm performance. 
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 Pathan and Skully (2010) contend that a CEO with power can be an advantage or a 
disadvantage to a bank.  A bank with high monitoring costs may benefit; however, they argue 
that the CEO and chairman roles should be separated to ensure board independence and that the 
CEO receives no special treatment.  Grove et al. (2009, 2011) test this relationship empirically 
and find a negative relationship between CEO power and ROA.  Thus, we must assume the null 
hypothesis. 
 Hypothesis 3:  CEO power has no effect on BHC performance. 
 The CEO or board member with a long tenure may be an advantage or a disadvantage.  
The expertise hypothesis as Pfeffer (1972) discusses, is that longer term directors or CEO should 
be more knowledgeable and effective than less senior directors.  Buchanan (1974) considers 
directors with longer tenures to be more committed to the organization and to company goals.  
Fiegener et al. (1996) study BHCs and find that board tenure is positively related to financial 
performance.  Conversely, the management friendliness hypothesis states that the longer term 
director or CEO is less likely to monitor because now they are too much of a friend to the firm.  
This can lead to weak corporate governance.  Empirical evidence of this hypothesis has also been 
done.  Beasley (1996) finds that director tenure increases are positively associated with financial 
statement fraud.  Vafeas (2005) finds that director tenure is negatively associated with earnings 
quality.  Another Vafeas (2003) study concludes that directors with tenures of over 20 years are 
more likely to be on nominating and compensation committees and to inflate the CEO’s salary.  
Thus, directors with a longer tenure are more likely to befriend and less likely to monitor 
managers and therefore more entrenched.  Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) find a negative 
relationship between director tenure and firm performance.  Grove et al. (2009) finds a negative 
relationship between old directors and Tobin’s Q and LLRR.  This may indicate that old 
directors are less active monitors.  They also find a positive relationship between old directors 
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and NCOR.  This means that there are less charge offs as the board gets older.  Grove et al. 
(2009) suggest that this may be a result of less board monitoring which allows the firm to 
understate charge offs.  Another study by Grove et al. (2011) finds a concave relationship 
between director age and ROA.  They discuss that this may be due to older directors being more 
experienced and knowledgeable; however, senior directors may be less up to date with modern 
financial products such as off balance sheet derivatives and could be detrimental to the board.  
Because CEO and director tenure may be an advantage or a disadvantage and there is no 
literature to base our assumptions on, we hypothesize the null. 
Hypothesis 4:  There is no relationship between CEO / BOD tenure and BHC 
performance.     
III. Data and Methodology 
 Our sample is obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s Bank Holding 
Company database.  The database contains all information that banks reported on form FR-Y-
9C, the consolidated balance sheet and income statements of the bank holding company, to the 
Federal Reserve Board since 1986.  Annual stock returns must be available and are obtained 
from Center for Research and Security Prices (CRSP).  Also, proxy statements have to be 
available either through Lexis-Nexis or the SEC website.  The largest 150 BHCs were selected in 
1999 and followed through to 2009.  The final sample consists of 1,124 observations over the 
eleven year period from 1999 to 2009.  One limitation of our study is its small sample size of 
only 150 BHCs (the largest 150 BHCs in 1999).  Publicly available databases generally have 
larger samples; however, the data available in those data sets also have consistency problems.  
Therefore, the entire set of data used in this paper is hand collected.      
 Insider board members are defined as a person that works for the bank.  Outsiders are 
defined as people who are not employed by the bank, who are not former employees of the bank, 
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or who are retired from the bank.  We should also note that the independence of the bank’s board 
may be overstated because a lending relationship between the directors or the directors’ 
employers is not disclosed on proxy statements.  
 Summary statistics are shown in Table 1.  The average board size for a BHC in our 
sample is 13.59 with 78.3% outsiders and 12.8% insiders.  60% of CEOs are also Chairman of 
the board of directors and the CEO has been on the board an average of 12.26 years.  The board 
of directors has been on the job for an average of 9.81 years.  The BHC in our sample has an 
average of $36.8 b in assets.  Table 2 shows correlations between the board composition and 
total asset variables.  There do not appear to be any correlations high enough to warrant any 
concerns.      
 Following previous literature, Yermack (1996), Adams and Mehran (2008), and Belkhir 
(2009), we use Tobin’s Q and ROA as our main proxies for firm performance in this study.  
Tobin’s Q is often used as a measure of profitability or market value.  As in these studies, we 
define Tobin’s Q as the book value of liabilities plus the market value of equity divided by the 
book value of liabilities plus the book value of equity.  Our second proxy for firm performance, 
return on assets (ROA), is a good measure because a firm’s profitability affects its market value.  
It also reflects the total firm profitability as opposed to the profitability on just one aspect of the 
firm, i.e. ROE.  We define ROA as the bank’s net income divided by total assets.     
 With the dependent variables of firm performance, we will run the following models 
using the log of board size, proportion of outside directors, proportion of inside directors, return 
on assets, and the log of firm size as independent variables.  Specifically, the equations are: 
TOBQ = a + B1LOG(BOARDSIZE) + B2OUTSIDERS + B3ROA + 
B4LOG(TOTALASSETS) + B5CEOPOWER + B6CEOTENURE + B7BODTENURE + e 
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 ROA = a + B1LOG(BOARDSIZE) + B2OUTSIDERS + B3LOG(TOTALASSETS) + 
B4CEOPOWER + B5CEOTENURE + B6BODTENURE + e 
where TOBQ is Tobin’s Q 
 LOG(BOARDSIZE) is the log of board size 
 OUTSIDERS is the proportion of outside directors on the board 
 ROA is the return on assets current year 
 LOG(TOTALASSETS) is the log of total assets  
 CEOPOWER is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is also chair of the board 
 CEOTENURE is the number of years the CEO has been on the board of directors 
And BODTENURE is the average of the tenure of each board member 
 As Grove et al. (2009), we also use loan loss reserve ratio (LLRR), non-performing asset 
ratio (NPAR), and net charge off ratio (NCOR) as other proxies for firm performance.  The loan 
loss reserve ratio (LLRR) is calculated as the amount of loan loss reserve over total assets.  The 
non-performing assets ratio (NPAR) is calculated as the amount of non-performing assets over 
total assets.  The net charge-offs ratio (NCOR) is calculated as the amount of net charge-offs 
over total assets.  We use each of these three ratios as the dependent variable in the following 
models: 
LLRR = a + B1LOG(BOARDSIZE) + B2OUTSIDERS + B3LOG(TOTALASSETS) + 
B4CEOPOWER + B5CEOTENURE + B6BODTENURE + e 
NPAR = a + B1LOG(BOARDSIZE) + B2OUTSIDERS + B3LOG(TOTALASSETS) + 
B4CEOPOWER + B5CEOTENURE + B6BODTENURE + e  
NCOR = a + B1LOG(BOARDSIZE) + B2OUTSIDERS + B3LOG(TOTALASSETS) + 
B4CEOPOWER + B5CEOTENURE + B6BODTENURE + e 
Where LLRR is loan loss reserve ratio 
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 NPAR is non-performing asset ratio 
And NCOR is net charge off ratio 
IV. Results 
a. Panel Estimation Results 
Data used in this paper has a panel structure so panel estimation is a natural choice for the 
model described above.  In order to do that first, we use the Hausman (1978) specification test 
which rejects the null hypothesis in favor of the fixed effects (RE) model.  Next we test for 
redundant fixed effects using a likelihood ratio test and we find that the null hypothesis that a 
cross-sectional and a period fixed effect is redundant is rejected.  These specification tests are 
consistent for all the panel estimation results presented in this section. 
Our results show that board size has a positive effect on BHC firm performance.  We can 
see this for Tobin’s Q, LLRR, NPAR and NCOR.  As shown in Table 3, a larger board will 
increase Tobin’s Q and decrease LLRR, NPAR and NCOR as shown in Tables 5, 6, and 7, 
respectively.  This supports the results of Andres and Vallelado (2008), Coles et al. (2008), 
Belkhir (2009) and Adams and Mehran (2008).  Thus, we reject our first hypothesis and 
conclude that board size has a positive effect on BHC performance.  
None of our proportion of outsiders variables were significant in any models.  Similar to 
Adams and Mehran (2008) and Belkhir (2009), we find no evidence that board structure has any 
effect on BHC firm performance.  Thus, we cannot reject our null hypothesis two that board 
structure has no effect on BHC performance. 
Each of the models we ran has a variable noted as CEO power.  None of these variables 
were significant for any of the models.  This is in direct contrast to Grove et al. (2009, 2011) who 
find a negative relationship between CEO power and ROA.  Therefore, we cannot reject our null 
hypothesis three and must conclude that CEO power has no effect on BHC performance.  
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The final hypothesis we made is if there is a relationship between CEO or board tenure 
and BHC performance.  In Table 4 we can see that CEO tenure has a positive, significant effect 
on ROA.  Thus perhaps supporting the argument of Pfeffer (1972) that longer term CEOs should 
be more knowledgeable and effective; or Buchanan (1974) that argues directors with longer 
tenures are more committed to the organization and to company goals.  Looking at Table 7 we 
see that CEO tenure decreases the net charge-offs ratio.  At the surface, this could be a good 
thing.  However, Grove et al. (2009) got similar results.  They found that there was a negative 
relationship between old directors and net charge-offs.  The older the directors were, the lower 
the charge-offs.  They postulate that this may be the result of less board monitoring which would 
allow the firm to understate charge offs.  Our results regarding board tenure are shown in Table 
3.  Board tenure has a positive effect on Tobin’s Q.  This result supports the findings of Fiegener 
et al. (1996) and also seems to support the expertise hypothesis.  Therefore, we have to reject the 
null; there is a positive relationship between CEO / board tenure and BHC firm performance.    
Our findings overall show that board size increases BHC firm performance, as measured 
by Tobin’s Q, LLRR, NPAR and NCOR.  We also see that CEO tenure has a positive effect on 
ROA and a negative effect on NCOR; BOD tenure has a positive effect on Tobin’s Q.  It seems 
that for a bank having a large board of directors is good, as well as an entrenched CEO and 
board.  Our results give evidence of the expertise hypothesis regarding CEO and board tenure. 
b. Results during the crisis 
Our data covers part of the current financial crisis; thus, we test whether the effect of 
corporate governance is any different during the crisis period compared to the normal period.  In 
order to test it, we take a dummy variable approach.  We create a crisis a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 for 2007, 2008 and 2009 and zero otherwise.  We use this dummy variable as 
an intercept as well as a slope dummy variable to disentangle the effect the crisis has had on the 
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performance of BHC as well as if any of the explanatory variables.  We then ran OLS 
regressions again for each of the models.  We did this in an effort to determine if there is a 
significant difference between our results before the crisis and during the crisis.   
Table 8 shows the results using Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable.  Here we see that 
during the crisis board size has a negative effect on Tobin’s Q.  This may be due to Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992) and Jensen’s (1993) argument that as the board gets bigger, problems will erupt 
and it will be harder for decisions to be made in a timely manner.   
In Table 11 we see some further interesting results.  We see that during the crisis, board 
size decreases the BHC’s NPAR.  We also see that during the crisis, as we expect, NPAR 
increases.  We further see that the proportion of outsiders decreases the NPAR, while the 
proportion of insiders increases the NPAR.  While a lot of empirical work has not come to a 
consensus about whether board structure affects firm performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1991; Yermack, 1996; Bhagat and Black, 2002; Adams and Mehran, 2008; Belkhir, 2009; and 
Francis et al. 2012), perhaps now we know why.  Board structure may only affect firm 
performance during a crisis when they are being heavily monitored by the regulators to be better 
monitors of the BHC thus reducing NPAR. 
 Overall our crisis results show us that board size has a negative effect on Tobin’s Q and 
NPAR.  While the negative effect on NPAR is a good thing, the negative effect on Tobin’s Q is 
definitely not.  We see in this case evidence that during a crisis the large board is perhaps too 
large to respond quickly to impending disaster and the board is too large for its own good; firm 
performance decreases.        
V. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examined the relationship between bank performance and several board 
characteristics, including board size, board structure, CEO power, CEO tenure and board tenure.  
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We proxied BHC performance as previous studies did using Tobin’s Q and ROA, and as Grove 
et al. (2009) using loan quality variables, i.e. loan loss reserve ratio, non-performing asset ratio 
and net charge-offs ratio.  We found evidence of improved firm performance between board size 
and the BHC for Tobin’s Q, LLRR, NPAR and NCOR.  This supports the evidence found by 
Andres and Vallelado (2008), Coles et al. (2008), Belkhir (2009) and Adams and Mehran (2008).  
However, we did not find any evidence of a relationship between board structure and firm 
performance (i.e. Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Mehran, 1995; Yermack, 1996; Klein, 1998; 
Bhagat and Black, 2002; Adams and Mehran, 2008; and Francis et al., 2012) or CEO power and 
firm performance (i.e. Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Abdullah, 2004; Weir and Liang, 2000; and 
Adams et al., 2005).  We did, similar to Fiegener et al. (1996), find a positive relationship 
between board tenure and Tobin’s Q.  We also found evidence of improved performance 
between CEO tenure and ROA and NCOR, thus supporting the expertise hypothesis that 
suggests that the longer term CEOs and directors may be assets to the firm because they have 
more experience and knowledge.  
 Results during the crisis show that firm performance decreases with board size, thus 
supporting Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen’s (1993) theories that a board that is too big 
may be ineffective and unable to respond quickly to firm problems.  We do see, however, that a 
large board decreases NPAR during the crisis.  We also find that board structure decreases 
NPAR during the crisis.  The board and its outsiders may be doing a better job of monitoring 
non-performing assets during the crisis, especially when it is under scrutiny from stakeholders, 
the media and regulators.   
 There are several areas of future research.  The first area would be to include CEO and 
board equity holdings as measures of entrenchment.  We used only one measure of entrenchment 
in this study for each, CEO tenure and board tenure.  Another paper could be to compare the 
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boards of directors’ characteristics of banks who failed to a matched sample of those who did 
not.  Perhaps there is a difference in the corporate governance characteristics of those firms who 
survived from those who failed that we can learn from.    
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics for Sample of BHCs from 1999 to 2009 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for select financial variables, board size and board composition and control 
variables for our sample from 1999 to 2009.  Our sample consists of 1124 observations from 150 BHCs.  All 
financial variables were collected from Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies (Form FR-
Y-9C) from the Federal Reserve Board.  Proxy statement data was collected from SEC database.  Tobin’s Q is the 
book value of liabilities plus the market value of equity divided by the book value of liabilities plus the book value 
of equity.  ROA is the bank’s net income divided by total assets.  The loan loss reserve ratio (LLRR) is calculated as 
the amount of loan loss reserve over total assets.  The non-performing assets ratio (NPAR) is calculated as the 
amount of non-performing assets over total assets.  The net charge-offs ratio (NCOR) is calculated as the amount of 
net charge-offs over total assets.  CEO Power is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also 
Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has been on the board of directors.  
BOD Tenure is the average number of years the board members have been on the board of directors.  The tenure of 
each director is calculated and then an average is taken of all of the directors.  A board member is defined as an 
insider if he is an employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as those board members that are not insiders, not 
formerly employed by the bank and not relatives of those that are currently employed by the bank.   
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: Performance Variables      
Tobin’s Q 1067 1.08575 0.075431 0.892454 1.500065 
ROA 1124 0.009882 0.010275 -0.069283 0.077282 
Loan Loss Reserve Ratio 1123 0.004398 0.007395 -0.004143 0.076315 
Non-Performing Asset Ratio 1124 0.00672 0.012254 0 0.242544 
Net Charge Off Ratio 1124 0.004233 0.006027 0 0.074688 
      
Panel B: Corporate Governance Variables      
Board Size 1124 13.59075 4.302844 5 32 
Board Tenure 1124 9.813068 3.074389 1.68 21.22222 
CEO Power 1124 0.600534 0.490007 0 1 
CEO Tenure 1124 12.26512 8.659637 0 50 
Outsiders 1124 0.783806 0.114367 0.3125 1 
Insiders 1124 0.127953 0.062213 0 0.4375 
      
Panel C: Asset Size      
Total Assets 1124 36821183 1.38E+08 875504 2.22E+09 
Log Total Assets 1124 16.04163 1.409395 13.68255 21.52282 
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Table 2 
Correlation of Corporate Governance Variables and Asset Size 
Table 2 shows correlation between corporate governance variables and asset size variables.  CEO Power is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the board of directors.  CEO tenure is the number of 
years the CEO has been on the board of directors.  Board Tenure is the average number of years the board members 
have been on the board of directors.  The tenure of each director is calculated and then an average is taken of all of 
the directors.  A board member is defined as an Insider if he is an employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as 
those board members that are not insiders, not formerly employed by the bank and not relatives of those that are 
currently employed by the bank.   
Variable Board Size Board 
Tenure 
CEO 
Power 
CEO 
Tenure 
Outsiders Insiders Total 
Assets 
Board Tenure -0.1148       
CEO Power 0.1122 0.0767      
CEO Tenure 0.0322 0.4727 0.3052     
Outsiders -0.0376 -0.1564 0.0638 -0.2607    
Insiders -0.2669 0.1044 0.1170 0.2450 -0.5886   
Total Assets 0.1440 -0.1314 0.1216 -0.0747 0.1452 -0.1382  
Log Total 
Assets 
0.2871 -0.0787 0.3187 0.0166 0.1383 -0.1574 0.5697 
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Table 3 
Fixed Effects Regressions on Tobin’s Q 
Table 3 shows fixed effects regressions of Tobin’s Q on the log of board size and asset size and board 
characteristics.  Tobin’s Q is the book value of liabilities plus the market value of equity divided by the book value 
of liabilities plus the book value of equity.  ROA is the bank’s net income divided by total assets.  CEO Power is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO tenure is the 
number of years the CEO has been on the board of directors.  BOD Tenure is the average number of years the board 
members have been on the board of directors.  The tenure of each director is calculated and then an average is taken 
of all of the directors.  A board member is defined as an insider if he is an employee of the bank.  Outsiders are 
classified as those board members that are not insiders, not formerly employed by the bank and not relatives of those 
that are currently employed by the bank.  Columns vary by the regressors they include.  Significance levels:  (***) - 
1% (**) - 5% (*) - 10%. 
 Dependent Variable:  Tobin’s Q   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size 0.0202** 
(2.4696) 
0.0242*** 
(2.8929) 
0.0189** 
(2.3213) 
0.0231*** 
(2.7716) 
0.0200** 
(2.4080) 
0.0241*** 
(2.8299) 
Outsiders     -0.0036 
(-0.1715) 
-0.0024 
(-0.1159) 
Insiders   -0.0478 
(-1.2562) 
-0.0378 
(-1.0018) 
  
ROA 3.4198*** 
(16.2949) 
3.4170*** 
(16.3764) 
3.4275*** 
(16.2889) 
3.4250*** 
(16.3618) 
3.4187*** 
(16.2592) 
3.4161*** 
(16.3345) 
Log Total Assets -0.0091*** 
(-3.4823) 
-0.0088*** 
(-3.3949) 
-0.0095*** 
(-3.6437) 
-0.0091*** 
(-3.5451) 
-0.0091*** 
(-3.4794) 
-0.0088*** 
(-3.3934) 
CEO Power 0.0014 
(0.2622) 
0.0024 
(0.5029) 
0.0020 
(0.3913) 
0.0032 
(0.6828) 
0.0014 
(0.2723) 
0.0024 
(0.5034) 
CEO Tenure 0.0003 
(1.1686) 
 0.0004 
(1.3555) 
 0.0003 
(1.1509) 
 
BOD Tenure  0.0025*** 
(3.2545) 
 0.0024*** 
(3.2286) 
 0.0025*** 
(3.2541) 
Constant 1.1417*** 
(27.3674) 
1.1052*** 
(25.5845) 
1.1563*** 
(27.7036) 
1.1180*** 
(25.8879) 
1.1450*** 
(23.7853) 
1.1075*** 
(22.4554) 
Sample Size 1067 1067 1067 1067 1067 1067 
F-Statistic 10.6594 10.8241 10.5919 10.7432 10.5586 10.7214 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.5679 0.5716 0.5687 0.5721 0.5679 0.5716 
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Table 4 
Fixed Effects Regressions on ROA 
Table 4 shows fixed effects regressions of ROA on the log of board size and asset size and board characteristics.  
ROA is the bank’s net income divided by total assets.  CEO Power is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the 
CEO is also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has been on the board 
of directors.  BOD Tenure is the average number of years the board members have been on the board of directors.  
The tenure of each director is calculated and then an average is taken of all of the directors.  A board member is 
defined as an insider if he is an employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as those board members that are not 
insiders, not formerly employed by the bank and not relatives of those that are currently employed by the bank.  
Columns vary by the regressors they include.  Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% (*) - 10%. 
 Dependent Variable:  ROA   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size 0.0021 
(1.3626) 
0.0024 
(1.5020) 
0.0024 
(1.5109) 
0.0028* 
(1.6879) 
0.0020 
(1.2533) 
0.0023 
(1.3677) 
Outsiders     -0.0031 
(-0.8117) 
-0.0038 
(-0.9823) 
Insiders   0.0087 
(1.3091) 
0.0108 
(1.6161) 
  
Log Total Assets -0.0012** 
(-2.4553) 
-0.0012** 
(-2.5354) 
-0.0011** 
(-2.2096) 
-0.0011** 
(-2.3240) 
-0.0012** 
(-2.4471) 
-0.0012** 
(-2.5215) 
CEO Power 0.0000 
(-0.0521) 
0.0000 
(0.6451) 
-0.0002 
(-0.1684) 
0.0003 
(0.3675) 
0.0000 
(0.0121) 
0.0006 
(0.6788) 
CEO Tenure 0.0001** 
(2.1658) 
 0.0001** 
(1.9714) 
 0.0001** 
(2.0839) 
 
BOD Tenure  0.0002 
(1.5212) 
 0.0002 
(1.5556) 
 0.0002 
(1.4570) 
Constant 0.0225*** 
(2.9697) 
0.0209*** 
(2.6940) 
0.0198*** 
(2.5842) 
0.0172** 
(2.1411) 
0.0253*** 
(2.8056) 
0.0244*** 
(2.6679) 
Sample Size 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
F-Statistic 1.9340 1.9100 1.9338 1.9208 1.9228 1.9028 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.1822 0.1803 0.1836 0.1826 0.1828 0.1812 
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Table 5 
Fixed Effects Regressions on Loan Loss Reserve Ratio 
Table 5 shows fixed effects regressions of loan loss reserve ratio on the log of board size and asset size and board 
characteristics.  The loan loss reserve ratio (LLRR) is calculated as the amount of loan loss reserve over total assets.  
CEO Power is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO 
tenure is the number of years the CEO has been on the board of directors.  BOD Tenure is the average number of 
years the board members have been on the board of directors.  The tenure of each director is calculated and then an 
average is taken of all of the directors.  A board member is defined as an insider if he is an employee of the bank.  
Outsiders are classified as those board members that are not insiders, not formerly employed by the bank and not 
relatives of those that are currently employed by the bank.  Columns vary by the regressors they include.  
Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% (*) - 10%. 
 Dependent Variable:  LLRR   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size -0.0018* 
(-1.8091) 
-0.0016 
(-1.5802) 
-0.0020** 
(-1.9684) 
-0.0018* 
(-1.7772) 
-0.0016 
(-1.6222) 
-0.0013 
(-1.3461) 
Outsiders     0.0037 
(1.4005) 
0.0045* 
(1.6892) 
Insiders   -0.0059 
(-1.3170) 
-0.0069 
(-1.5137) 
  
Log Total Assets 0.0013*** 
(3.4569) 
0.0013*** 
(3.7030) 
0.0012*** 
(3.3493) 
0.0013*** 
(3.5459) 
0.0013*** 
(3.4537) 
0.0013*** 
(3.6961) 
CEO Power -0.0004 
(-0.5788) 
-0.0009 
(-1.4619) 
-0.0003 
(-0.4674) 
-0.0008 
(-1.2009) 
-0.0005 
(-0.6838) 
-0.0009 
(-1.5214) 
CEO Tenure -0.0001* 
(-1.7869) 
 -0.0001 
(-1.6044) 
 -0.0001 
(-1.6088) 
 
BOD Tenure  0.0001 
(0.9914) 
 0.0001 
(0.9431) 
 0.0001 
(1.1320) 
Constant -0.0103* 
(-1.8416) 
-0.0135** 
(-2.4425) 
-0.0085 
(-1.5186) 
-0.0111** 
(-1.9715) 
-0.0137* 
(-2.0613) 
-0.0177*** 
(-2.7210) 
Sample Size 1123 1123 1123 1123 1123 1123 
F-Statistic 1.7059 1.6831 1.7054 1.6890 1.7094 1.6966 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.1644 0.1625 0.1657 0.1643 0.1660 0.1649 
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Table 6 
Fixed Effects Regressions on Non-Performing Assets Ratio 
Table 6 shows fixed effects regressions of non-performing assets ratio on the log of board size and asset size and 
board characteristics.  The non-performing assets ratio (NPAR) is calculated as the amount of non-performing assets 
over total assets.  CEO Power is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board 
of Directors.  CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has been on the board of directors.  BOD Tenure is the 
average number of years the board members have been on the board of directors.  The tenure of each director is 
calculated and then an average is taken of all of the directors.  A board member is defined as an insider if he is an 
employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as those board members that are not insiders, not formerly employed 
by the bank and not relatives of those that are currently employed by the bank.  Columns vary by the regressors they 
include.  Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% (*) - 10%. 
 Dependent Variable:  NPAR   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size -0.0033** 
(-2.1038) 
-0.0031* 
(-1.9365) 
-0.0034** 
(-2.1908) 
-0.0032** 
(-2.0551) 
-0.0032** 
(-2.0053) 
-0.0030* 
(-1.8017) 
Outsiders     0.0022 
(0.5498) 
0.0029 
(0.7076) 
Insiders   -0.0036 
(-0.5771) 
-0.0044 
(-0.6784) 
  
Log Total Assets 0.0017*** 
(2.7750) 
0.0018*** 
(3.0044) 
0.0017*** 
(2.6884) 
0.0017*** 
(2.8567) 
0.0017*** 
(2.7716) 
0.0018*** 
(2.9938) 
CEO Power 0.0000 
(0.0175) 
-0.0004 
(-0.4699) 
0.0001 
(0.0612) 
-0.0003 
(-0.3538) 
0.0000 
(-0.0248) 
-0.0004 
(-0.5002) 
CEO Tenure -0.0001 
(-0.8677) 
 0.0000 
(-0.8167) 
 0.0000 
(-0.8097) 
 
BOD Tenure  0.0001 
(0.7216) 
 0.0001 
(0.6980) 
 0.0001 
(0.7842) 
Constant -0.0114 
(-1.4117) 
-0.0143* 
(-1.8791) 
-0.0102 
(-1.2146) 
-0.0128 
(-1.5350) 
-0.0134 
(-1.5438) 
-0.0170** 
(-2.0945) 
Sample Size 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
F-Statistic 3.0968 3.0910 3.0700 3.0657 3.0706 3.0673 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.2629 0.2626 0.2631 0.2628 0.2631 0.2629 
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Table 7 
Fixed Effects Regressions on Net Charge-Offs Ratio 
Table 7 shows fixed effects regressions of net charge-offs ratio on the log of board size and asset size and board 
characteristics.  The net charge-offs ratio (NCOR) is calculated as the amount of net charge-offs over total assets.  
CEO Power is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO 
tenure is the number of years the CEO has been on the board of directors.  BOD Tenure is the average number of 
years the board members have been on the board of directors.  The tenure of each director is calculated and then an 
average is taken of all of the directors.  A board member is defined as an insider if he is an employee of the bank.  
Outsiders are classified as those board members that are not insiders, not formerly employed by the bank and not 
relatives of those that are currently employed by the bank.  Columns vary by the regressors they include.  
Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% (*) - 10%. 
 Dependent Variable:  NCOR   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size -0.0022*** 
(-2.6031) 
-0.0021** 
(-2.5186) 
-0.0023*** 
(-2.7219) 
-0.0023*** 
(-2.6710) 
-0.0021** 
(-2.4220) 
-0.0020** 
(-2.3001) 
Outsiders     0.0031 
(1.4207) 
0.0037* 
(1.6783) 
Insiders   -0.0047 
(-1.2521) 
-0.0057 
(-1.5093) 
  
Log Total Assets 0.0007** 
(2.4708) 
0.0008*** 
(2.6529) 
0.0007** 
(2.3608) 
0.0007** 
(2.4920) 
0.0007** 
(2.4681) 
0.0008*** 
(2.6454) 
CEO Power -0.0003 
(-0.5425) 
-0.0007 
(-1.3907) 
-0.0003 
(-0.4320) 
-0.0006 
(-1.1174) 
-0.0004 
(-0.6509) 
-0.0008 
(-1.4496) 
CEO Tenure -0.0001** 
(-2.1528) 
 -0.0001** 
(-1.9665) 
 -0.0001** 
(-1.9672) 
 
BOD Tenure  0.0000 
(0.0769) 
 0.0000 
(0.0339) 
 0.0000 
(0.2113) 
Constant -0.0009** 
(-0.1898) 
-0.0023 
(-0.5054) 
0.0006 
(0.1309) 
-0.0003 
(-0.0609) 
-0.0037 
(-0.6792) 
-0.0057 
(-1.0655) 
Sample Size 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
F-Statistic 1.8453 1.8043 1.8428 1.8100 1.8494 1.8178 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.1753 0.1721 0.1765 0.1739 0.1770 0.1745 
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Table 8 
OLS Regressions on Tobin’s Q Including Crisis Dummy 
Table 8 shows OLS regressions of Tobin’s Q on the log of board size and asset size and board characteristics when 
we include a dummy for the recent financial crisis.  We do this to determine if there was a significant change in our 
results due to the financial crisis.  Tobin’s Q is the book value of liabilities plus the market value of equity divided 
by the book value of liabilities plus the book value of equity.  ROA is the bank’s net income divided by total assets.  
CEO Power is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO 
tenure is the number of years the CEO has been on the board of directors.  BOD Tenure is the average number of 
years the board members have been on the board of directors.  The tenure of each director is calculated and then an 
average is taken of all of the directors.  A board member is defined as an insider if he is an employee of the bank.  
Outsiders are classified as those board members that are not insiders, not formerly employed by the bank and not 
relatives of those that are currently employed by the bank.  Columns vary by the regressors they include.  
Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% (*) - 10%. 
 Dependent Variable:  Tobin’s Q   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size 0.0169** 
(2.3523) 
0.0197** 
(2.4967) 
0.0169** 
(2.3662) 
0.2000** 
(2.5527) 
0.0137** 
(2.0255) 
0.0160** 
(2.1082) 
Outsiders   0.0085 
(0.4810) 
0.0212 
(1.1786) 
  
Insiders     -0.0543 
(-1.6280) 
-0.0649 
(-2.1561) 
ROA 6.8119*** 
(3.9948) 
6.6894*** 
(3.9908) 
6.8067*** 
(3.9879) 
6.6778*** 
(3.9777) 
6.7354*** 
(3.9177) 
6.6042*** 
(3.9245) 
Log Total Assets 0.0020 
(1.2527) 
0.0025 
(1.5317) 
0.0020 
(1.1970) 
0.0023 
(1.3914) 
0.0018 
(1.1322) 
0.0021 
(1.3603) 
CEO Power 0.0088** 
(2.0546) 
0.0060 
(1.4868) 
0.0085** 
(1.9680) 
0.0058 
(1.4200) 
0.0097** 
(2.2847) 
0.0076* 
(1.8842) 
CEO Tenure -0.0003 
(-0.9920) 
 -0.0002 
(-0.9027) 
 -0.0002 
(-0.6211) 
 
BOD Tenure  0.0019** 
(2.2138) 
 0.0020** 
(2.4013) 
 0.0019** 
(2.2735) 
Crisis 0.2481*** 
(4.0567) 
0.2368*** 
(3.9253) 
0.2790*** 
(3.8878) 
0.2557*** 
(3.5961) 
0.2563*** 
(3.7862) 
0.2436*** 
(3.7515) 
Log Board Size * Crisis -0.0385** 
(-2.0957) 
-0.0404** 
(-2.2445) 
-0.0416** 
(-2.1422) 
-0.0412** 
(-2.1987) 
-0.0387** 
(-2.0939) 
-0.0402** 
(-2.2383) 
Outsiders * Crisis   -0.0362 
(-0.8618) 
-0.0255 
(-0.5868) 
  
Insiders * Crisis     -0.0463 
(-0.5354) 
-0.0441 
(-0.5073) 
ROA * Crisis -4.8608*** 
(-2.8227) 
-4.7811*** 
(-2.8271) 
-4.8330*** 
(-2.8021) 
-4.7655*** 
(-2.8122) 
-4.7971*** 
(-2.7648) 
-4.7128*** 
(-2.7772) 
Log Total Assets * Crisis -0.0100*** 
(-2.9214) 
-0.0099*** 
(-2.9467) 
-0.0096*** 
(-2.7485) 
-0.0096*** 
(-2.7888) 
-0.0102*** 
(-2.9683) 
-0.0102*** 
(-3.0158) 
CEO Power * Crisis 0.0012 
(0.1166) 
0.0029 
(0.3116) 
0.0023 
(0.2263) 
0.0032 
(0.3408) 
0.0014 
(0.1354) 
0.0034 
(0.3491) 
CEO Tenure * Crisis 0.0006 
(1.1234) 
 0.0005 
(0.8800) 
 0.0006 
(1.1135) 
 
BOD Tenure * Crisis  0.0018 
(1.0059) 
 0.0016 
(0.8853) 
 0.0019 
(1.0641) 
Constant 0.9393*** 
(33.9390) 
0.9067*** 
(28.2211) 
0.9335*** 
(32.8777) 
0.8919*** 
(27.4198) 
0.9578*** 
(34.5797) 
0.9296*** 
(29.6425) 
Sample Size 1067 1067 1067 1067 1067 1067 
F-Statistic 73.7485 75.9454 62.3734 64.3590 62.8472 64.9449 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.4347 0.4419 0.4350 0.4428 0.4369 0.4450 
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Table 9 
OLS Regressions on ROA Including Crisis Dummy 
Table 9 shows OLS regressions of ROA on the log of board size and asset size and board characteristics when we 
include a dummy for the recent financial crisis.  We do this to determine if there was a significant change in our 
results due to the financial crisis.  ROA is the bank’s net income divided by total assets.  CEO Power is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO tenure is the number of 
years the CEO has been on the board of directors.  BOD Tenure is the average number of years the board members 
have been on the board of directors.  The tenure of each director is calculated and then an average is taken of all of 
the directors.  A board member is defined as an insider if he is an employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as 
those board members that are not insiders, not formerly employed by the bank and not relatives of those that are 
currently employed by the bank.  Columns vary by the regressors they include.  Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) 
- 5% (*) - 10%. 
 Dependent Variable:  ROA   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size 0.0006 
(0.7499) 
0.0009 
(1.0877) 
0.0006 
(0.7555) 
0.0009 
(1.1090) 
0.0000 
(-0.0463) 
0.0004 
(0.4705) 
Outsiders   0.0018 
(1.2636) 
0.0015 
(1.0692) 
  
Insiders     -0.0097*** 
(-3.3785) 
-0.0081*** 
(-2.9414) 
Log Total Assets 0.0003** 
(2.4878) 
0.0003** 
(2.5776) 
0.0003** 
(2.3338) 
0.0003** 
(2.4314) 
0.0003** 
(2.1096) 
0.0003** 
(2.2137) 
CEO Power 0.0000 
(-0.1169) 
0.0000 
(0.1241) 
-0.0001 
(-0.2354) 
0.0000 
(0.0927) 
0.0001 
(0.3305) 
0.0003 
(0.6960) 
CEO Tenure 0.0000** 
(1.9882) 
 0.0001** 
(2.2160) 
 0.0001** 
(2.5634) 
 
BOD Tenure  0.0002*** 
(2.6886) 
 0.0002*** 
(2.7907) 
 0.0002*** 
(2.7848) 
Crisis -0.0209 
(-1.1170) 
-0.0249 
(-1.2038) 
-0.0434* 
(-1.9369) 
-0.0520* 
(-2.1081) 
-0.0202 
(-0.9329) 
-0.0229 
(-0.9934) 
Log Board Size * Crisis 0.0056 
(0.8566) 
0.0053 
(0.7942) 
0.0084 
(1.2792) 
0.0086 
(1.2752) 
0.0056 
(0.8527) 
0.0052 
(0.7721) 
Outsiders * Crisis   0.0247 
(1.6449) 
0.0287* 
(1.8807) 
  
Insiders * Crisis     -0.0053 
(-0.1726) 
-0.0096 
(-0.3250) 
Log Total Assets * Crisis -0.0003 
(-0.2918) 
-0.0002 
(-0.1565) 
-0.0006 
(-0.5966) 
-0.006 
(-0.5690) 
-0.0003 
(-0.3047) 
-0.0002 
(-0.2069) 
CEO Power * Crisis -0.0018 
(-0.5138) 
-0.0027 
(-0.8440) 
-0.0026 
(-0.7498) 
-0.0029 
(-0.9571) 
-0.0018 
(-0.4981) 
-0.0025 
(-0.7493) 
CEO Tenure * Crisis -0.0001 
(-0.4148) 
 0.0000 
(-0.0314) 
 -0.0001 
(-0.3885) 
 
BOD Tenure * Crisis  0.0002 
(0.3184) 
 0.0004 
(0.8032) 
 0.0002 
(0.3530) 
Constant 0.0048* 
(1.7347) 
0.0023 
(0.6768) 
0.0036 
(1.2738) 
0.0012 
(0.3692) 
0.0080*** 
(2.7167) 
0.0051 
(1.4135) 
Sample Size 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
F-Statistic 38.6649 39.4953 33.5318 34.8224 32.1698 32.8135 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.2380 0.2419 0.2491 0.2562 0.2414 0.2451 
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Table 10 
OLS Regressions on Loan Loss Reserve Ratio Including Crisis Dummy 
Table 10 shows OLS regressions of loan loss reserve ratio on the log of board size and asset size and board 
characteristics when we include a dummy for the recent financial crisis.  We do this to determine if there was a 
significant change in our results due to the financial crisis.  The loan loss reserve ratio (LLRR) is calculated as the 
amount of loan loss reserve over total assets.  CEO Power is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is 
also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has been on the board of 
directors.  BOD Tenure is the average number of years the board members have been on the board of directors.  The 
tenure of each director is calculated and then an average is taken of all of the directors.  A board member is defined 
as an insider if he is an employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as those board members that are not insiders, 
not formerly employed by the bank and not relatives of those that are currently employed by the bank.  Columns 
vary by the regressors they include.  Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% (*) - 10%. 
 Dependent Variable:  LLRR   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size -0.0008** 
(-2.4714) 
-0.0008*** 
(-2.6848) 
-0.0008** 
(-2.4632) 
-0.0008*** 
(-2.6408) 
-0.0005 
(-1.5353) 
-0.0006** 
(-2.0112) 
Outsiders   0.0004 
(0.5395) 
0.0009 
(1.1521) 
  
Insiders     0.0048* 
(2.7219) 
0.0036** 
(2.1932) 
Log Total Assets 0.0004*** 
(5.7010) 
0.0004*** 
(5.6862) 
0.0004*** 
(5.5974) 
0.0004*** 
(5.5432) 
0.0004*** 
(5.9683) 
0.0004*** 
(5.8831) 
CEO Power -0.0006*** 
(-2.8297) 
-0.0007*** 
(-3.3220) 
-0.0006*** 
(-2.9039) 
-0.0007*** 
(-3.3638) 
-0.0007*** 
(-3.1145) 
-0.0008*** 
(-3.5794) 
CEO Tenure 0.0000*** 
(-2.7807) 
 0.0000*** 
(-2.4515) 
 0.0000*** 
(-3.2818) 
 
BOD Tenure  0.0000* 
(-1.6609) 
 0.0000 
(-1.4813) 
 0.0000* 
(-1.7600) 
Crisis 0.0128 
(0.8701) 
0.0117 
(0.7226) 
0.0258 
(1.4746) 
0.0253 
(1.3147) 
0.0184 
(1.0846) 
0.0167 
(0.9271) 
Log Board Size * Crisis -0.0081 
(-1.5005) 
-0.0080 
(-1.4853) 
-0.0096* 
(-1.7122) 
-0.0095* 
(-1.6736) 
-0.0089 
(-1.600) 
-0.0086 
(-1.5799) 
Outsiders * Crisis   -0.0146 
(-1.1809) 
-0.0149 
(-1.1832) 
  
Insiders * Crisis     -0.0195 
(-1.0800) 
-0.0173 
(-0.9879) 
Log Total Assets * Crisis 0.0010 
(1.1344) 
0.0010 
(1.1505) 
0.0012 
(1.2948) 
0.0012 
(1.3434) 
0.0009 
(1.0131) 
0.0009 
(1.0022) 
CEO Power * Crisis 0.0015 
(0.4732) 
0.0020 
(0.7573) 
0.0019 
(0.6370) 
0.0021 
(0.8240) 
0.0017 
(0.5474) 
0.0023 
(0.8589) 
CEO Tenure * Crisis 0.0001 
(0.4661) 
 0.0000 
(0.2300) 
 0.0001 
(0.5854) 
 
BOD Tenure * Crisis  0.0002 
(0.5014) 
 0.0001 
(0.2456) 
 0.0002 
(0.5529) 
Constant -0.0011 
(-0.8428) 
-0.0008 
(-0.5741) 
-0.0014 
(-0.9722) 
-0.0014 
(-0.9194) 
-0.0027* 
(-1.9579) 
-0.0021 
(-1.3920) 
Sample Size 1123 1123 1123 1123 1123 1123 
F-Statistic 57.0975 56.9626 47.9421 47.8304 47.2600 47.0093 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.3159 0.3154 0.3219 0.3214 0.3188 0.3176 
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Table 11 
OLS Regressions on Non-Performing Assets Ratio Including Crisis Dummy 
Table 11 shows OLS regressions of loan loss reserve ratio on the log of board size and asset size and board 
characteristics when we include a dummy for the recent financial crisis.  We do this to determine if there was a 
significant change in our results due to the financial crisis.  The non-performing assets ratio (NPAR) is calculated as 
the amount of non-performing assets over total assets.  CEO Power is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the 
CEO is also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has been on the board 
of directors.  BOD Tenure is the average number of years the board members have been on the board of directors.  
The tenure of each director is calculated and then an average is taken of all of the directors.  A board member is 
defined as an insider if he is an employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as those board members that are not 
insiders, not formerly employed by the bank and not relatives of those that are currently employed by the bank.  
Columns vary by the regressors they include.  Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% (*) - 10%. 
 Dependent Variable:  NPAR   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size -0.0017*** 
(-3.8283) 
-0.0020*** 
(-4.4175) 
-0.0017*** 
(-3.8370) 
-0.0020*** 
(-4.4614) 
-0.0013*** 
(-2.8064) 
-0.0017*** 
(-3.7379) 
Outsiders   -0.0036*** 
(-2.8736) 
-0.0027** 
(-2.2290) 
  
Insiders     0.0074*** 
(2.7936) 
0.0053** 
(2.1421) 
Log Total Assets 0.0002* 
(1.7150) 
0.0002* 
(1.6977) 
0.0002** 
(2.0450) 
0.0002* 
(1.9444) 
0.0002** 
(2.0995) 
0.0002** 
(1.9762) 
CEO Power -0.0001 
(-0.2694) 
-0.0003 
(-1.1428) 
0.0000 
(0.0636) 
-0.0003 
(-1.0593) 
-0.0002 
(-0.7392) 
-0.0004* 
(-1.6568) 
CEO Tenure -0.0001*** 
(-3.6813) 
 -0.0001*** 
(-4.4341) 
 -0.0001*** 
(-4.0495) 
 
BOD Tenure  -0.0002*** 
(-3.6169) 
 -0.0002*** 
(-4.0107) 
 -0.0002*** 
(-3.7097) 
Crisis 0.0727*** 
(3.1377) 
0.0775*** 
(3.0121) 
0.1270*** 
(3.5994) 
0.1406*** 
(3.3139) 
0.0514** 
(2.0934) 
0.0524** 
(2.0670) 
Log Board Size * Crisis -0.0308** 
(-2.1665) 
-0.0302** 
(-2.0702) 
-0.0375** 
(-2.4382) 
-0.0378** 
(-2.3537) 
-0.0281** 
(-2.0304) 
-0.0272** 
(-1.9731) 
Outsiders * Crisis   -0.0598** 
(-2.3803) 
-0.0673** 
(-2.2921) 
  
Insiders * Crisis     0.0815* 
(1.8245) 
0.0922* 
(2.0848) 
Log Total Assets * Crisis 0.0009 
(0.5350) 
0.0004 
(0.2970) 
0.0016 
(0.8836) 
0.0014 
(0.8355) 
0.0013 
(0.7630) 
0.0010 
(0.6658) 
CEO Power * Crisis 0.0004 
(0.0574) 
0.0043 
(0.8825) 
0.0022 
(0.3174) 
0.0050 
(1.0910) 
-0.0004 
(-0.0567) 
0.0025 
(0.5224) 
CEO Tenure * Crisis 0.0006 
(1.0390) 
 0.0004 
(0.7908) 
 0.0005 
(0.8381) 
 
BOD Tenure * Crisis  0.0006 
(0.6202) 
 0.0000 
(0.0269) 
 0.0004 
(0.4692) 
Constant 0.0070*** 
(4.5926) 
0.0087*** 
(5.0806) 
0.0094*** 
(5.2286) 
0.0106*** 
(5.5684) 
0.0045*** 
(2.6465) 
0.0069*** 
(3.5741) 
Sample Size 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
F-Statistic 57.9841 54.2395 57.6732 56.4613 52.8928 50.7362 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.3190 0.3047 0.3633 0.3584 0.3435 0.3342 
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Table 12 
OLS Regressions on Net Charge-Offs Ratio Including Crisis Dummy 
Table 12 shows OLS regressions of loan loss reserve ratio on the log of board size and asset size and board 
characteristics when we include a dummy for the recent financial crisis.  We do this to determine if there was a 
significant change in our results due to the financial crisis.  The net charge-offs ratio (NCOR) is calculated as the 
amount of net charge-offs over total assets.  CEO Power is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is 
also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has been on the board of 
directors.  BOD Tenure is the average number of years the board members have been on the board of directors.  The 
tenure of each director is calculated and then an average is taken of all of the directors.  A board member is defined 
as an insider if he is an employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as those board members that are not insiders, 
not formerly employed by the bank and not relatives of those that are currently employed by the bank.  Columns 
vary by the regressors they include.  Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% (*) - 10%. 
 Dependent Variable:  NCOR   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size -0.0012*** 
(-3.4336) 
-0.0014*** 
(-3.7972) 
-0.0012*** 
(-3.4306) 
-0.0014*** 
(-3.7444) 
-0.0011*** 
(-3.0244) 
-0.0014*** 
(-3.6393) 
Outsiders   0.0016** 
(2.1584) 
0.0022*** 
(3.0801) 
  
Insiders     0.0025 
(1.6114) 
0.0008 
(0.5596) 
Log Total Assets 0.0004*** 
(6.3363) 
0.0004*** 
(6.2563) 
0.0004*** 
(6.0560) 
0.0004*** 
(5.9007) 
0.0025*** 
(6.4625) 
0.0004*** 
(6.2457) 
CEO Power -0.0004** 
(-2.2476) 
-0.0006*** 
(-3.2367) 
-0.0005** 
(-2.4819) 
-0.0006*** 
(-3.3473) 
-0.0005** 
(-2.4245) 
-0.0006*** 
(-3.2410) 
CEO Tenure -0.0001*** 
(-4.9427) 
 -0.0001*** 
(-4.3995) 
 -0.0001*** 
(-5.1317) 
 
BOD Tenure  -0.0001*** 
(-3.8042) 
 -0.0001*** 
(-3.5269) 
 -0.0001*** 
(-3.8214) 
Crisis 0.0165 
(1.3032) 
0.0144 
(1.0461) 
0.0259* 
(1.8579) 
0.0243 
(1.6207) 
0.0233 
(1.5155) 
0.0196 
(1.2572) 
Log Board Size * Crisis -0.0058 
(-1.4106) 
-0.0056 
(-1.3558) 
-0.0068* 
(-1.6837) 
-0.0066 
(-1.6072) 
-0.0066 
(-1.5471) 
-0.0062 
(-1.4688) 
Outsiders * Crisis   -0.0109 
(-1.1023) 
-0.0112 
(-1.1667) 
  
Insiders * Crisis     -0.0209 
(-1.4806) 
-0.0184 
(-1.3598) 
Log Total Assets * Crisis 0.0002 
(0.3056) 
0.0002 
(0.2790) 
0.0003 
(0.4818) 
0.0003 
(0.4879) 
0.0001 
(0.1551) 
0.0001 
(0.1167) 
CEO Power * Crisis 0.0015 
(0.6482) 
0.0019 
(0.9276) 
0.0018 
(0.8132) 
0.0020 
(0.9881) 
0.0017 
(0.7464) 
0.0023 
(1.0441) 
CEO Tenure * Crisis 0.0001 
(0.7659) 
 0.0001 
(0.5117) 
 0.0001 
(0.9337) 
 
BOD Tenure * Crisis  0.0003 
(0.8462) 
 0.0002 
(0.6300) 
 0.0003 
(0.9213) 
Constant 0.0001 
(0.0634) 
0.0012 
(0.6826) 
-0.0010 
(-0.6292) 
-0.0003 
(-0.1882) 
-0.0008 
(-0.4814) 
0.0009 
(0.5009) 
Sample Size 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
F-Statistic 37.5488 37.2654 31.4526 31.3139 31.4696 31.1093 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.2328 0.2314 0.2373 0.2365 0.2374 0.2353 
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Appendix - Table 1 
OLS Regressions on Tobin’s Q 
Table 1 shows OLS regressions of Tobin’s Q on the log of board size and asset size and board characteristics.  
Tobin’s Q is the book value of liabilities plus the market value of equity divided by the book value of liabilities plus 
the book value of equity.  ROA is the bank’s net income divided by total assets.  CEO Power is a dummy variable 
that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO tenure is the number of years the 
CEO has been on the board of directors.  BOD Tenure is the average number of years the board members have been 
on the board of directors.  The tenure of each director is calculated and then an average is taken of all of the directors.  
A board member is defined as an insider if he is an employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as those board 
members that are not insiders, not formerly employed by the bank and not relatives of those that are currently 
employed by the bank.    Columns vary by the regressors they include.  Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% (*) 
- 10%. 
 Dependent Variable:  Tobin’s Q   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size 0.0158** 
(2.3328) 
0.0187*** 
(2.6219) 
0.0142** 
(1.9783) 
0.0114* 
(1.6610) 
0.0158** 
(2.3409) 
0.0189*** 
(2.6739) 
Outsiders     -0.0017 
(-0.0946) 
0.0076 
(0.4140) 
Insiders   -0.0813*** 
(-2.6599) 
-0.0799** 
(-2.5010) 
  
ROA 4.0898*** 
(9.5634) 
4.0742*** 
(9.6872) 
4.0569*** 
(9.7199) 
4.0705*** 
(9.5970) 
4.0903*** 
(9.5563) 
4.0724*** 
(9.6782) 
Log Total Assets 0.0004 
(0.2903) 
0.0007 
(0.5330) 
0.0003 
(0.1967) 
0.0000 
(0.0048) 
0.0004 
(0.2989) 
0.0007 
(0.4693) 
CEO Power 0.0099** 
(2.2462) 
0.0083** 
(2.0245) 
0.0103** 
(2.5054) 
0.0112** 
(2.5593) 
0.0100** 
(2.2358) 
0.0082** 
(1.9957) 
CEO Tenure 0.0099 
(-0.0738) 
  0.0001 
(0.3835) 
0.0000 
(-0.1034) 
 
BOD Tenure  0.0020*** 
(2.9760) 
0.0021*** 
(3.0951) 
  0.0021*** 
(3.0873) 
Constant 0.9923*** 
(35.3121) 
0.9607*** 
(31.5048) 
0.9883*** 
(31.2774) 
1.0183*** 
(34.6843) 
0.9935*** 
(33.9363) 
0.9551*** 
(30.2095) 
Sample Size 1067 1067 1067 1067 1067 1067 
F-Statistic 101.4319 104.5151 88.5482 85.8327 84.4493 87.0672 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.3234 0.3300 0.3339 0.3270 0.3234 0.3301 
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Appendix - Table 2 
OLS Regressions on ROA 
Table 2 shows OLS regressions of ROA on the log of board size and asset size and board characteristics.  ROA is 
the bank’s net income divided by total assets.  CEO Power is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is 
also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has been on the board of 
directors.  BOD Tenure is the average number of years the board members have been on the board of directors.  The 
tenure of each director is calculated and then an average is taken of all of the directors.  A board member is defined 
as an insider if he is an employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as those board members that are not insiders, 
not formerly employed by the bank and not relatives of those that are currently employed by the bank.  Columns 
vary by the regressors they include.  Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% (*) - 10%. 
 Dependent Variable:  ROA   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size 0.0021** 
(2.0795) 
0.0023** 
(2.1492) 
0.0018 
(1.6124) 
0.0021* 
(1.8082) 
0.0022** 
(2.1024) 
0.0024** 
(2.2682) 
Outsiders     0.0026 
(0.9300) 
0.0021 
(0.7627) 
Insiders   -0.0059 
(-0.9543) 
-0.0046 
(-0.7819) 
  
Log Total Assets 0.0000 
(0.0771) 
0.0000 
(0.0564) 
0.0000 
(-0.0656) 
0.0000 
(-0.0675) 
0.0000 
(-0.0385) 
0.0000 
(-0.0448) 
CEO Power -0.0001 
(-0.1712) 
0.0000 
(0.0661) 
0.0000 
(-0.0298) 
0.0002 
(0.2263) 
-0.0002 
(-0.2607) 
0.0000 
(0.0416) 
CEO Tenure 0.0000 
(1.0185) 
 0.0001 
(1.1553) 
 0.0001 
(0.1390) 
 
BOD Tenure  0.0001 
(1.0027) 
 0.0001 
(1.0293) 
 0.0001 
(1.3443) 
Constant 0.0037 
(1.0058) 
0.0025 
(0.5650) 
0.0056 
(1.2826) 
0.0040 
(0.8148) 
0.0019 
(0.4207) 
0.0010 
(0.2100) 
Sample Size 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
F-Statistic 1.5815 1.6209 1.5057 1.4459 1.4380 1.4125 
(P-Value) (0.1769) (0.1667) (0.1852) (0.2051) (0.2078) (0.2170) 
R-squared 0.0056 0.0058 0.0067 0.0064 0.0064 (0.0063) 
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Appendix - Table 3 
OLS Regressions on Loan Loss Reserve Ratio 
Table 3 shows OLS regressions of LLRR on the log of board size and asset size and board characteristics.  The loan 
loss reserve ratio (LLRR) is calculated as the amount of loan loss reserve over total assets.  CEO Power is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO tenure is the number of 
years the CEO has been on the board of directors.  BOD Tenure is the average number of years the board members 
have been on the board of directors.  The tenure of each director is calculated and then an average is taken of all of 
the directors.  A board member is defined as an insider if he is an employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as 
those board members that are not insiders, not formerly employed by the bank and not relatives of those that are 
currently employed by the bank.  Columns vary by the regressors they include.  Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) 
- 5% (*) - 10%. 
 Dependent Variable:  LLRR   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size -0.0024*** 
(-3.3243) 
-0.0023*** 
(-3.2315) 
-0.0025*** 
(-3.0760) 
-0.0025*** 
(-3.1742) 
-0.0024*** 
(-3.3230) 
-0.0023*** 
(-3.0655) 
Outsiders     0.0007 
(0.3123) 
0.0015 
(0.7506) 
Insiders   -0.0017 
(-0.4659) 
-0.0026 
(-0.7679) 
  
Log Total Assets 0.0008*** 
(4.3597) 
0.0008*** 
(4.4999) 
0.0008*** 
(4.2705) 
0.0008*** 
(4.3566) 
0.0008*** 
(4.2939) 
0.0008*** 
(4.4638) 
CEO Power -0.0005 
(-0.9101) 
-0.0007 
(-1.4232) 
-0.0005 
(-0.8502) 
-0.0007 
(-1.2393) 
-0.0005 
(-0.9598) 
-0.0007 
(-1.5512) 
CEO Tenure 0.0000 
(-0.7344) 
 0.0000 
(-0.6235) 
 (0.0000) 
(-0.6858) 
 
BOD Tenure  0.0001 
(0.8156) 
 0.0001 
(0.8375) 
 0.0001 
(1.1304) 
Constant -0.0010 
(-0.3914) 
-0.0026 
(-0.8578) 
-0.0004 
(-0.1362) 
-0.0017 
(-0.4889) 
-0.0014 
(-0.5127) 
-0.0036 
(-1.0878) 
Sample Size 1123 1123 1123 1123 1123 1123 
F-Statistic 6.5014 6.5239 5.2382 5.3153 5.2185 5.3297 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
R-squared 0.0227 0.0228 0.0229 0.0232 0.0228 0.0233 
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Appendix - Table 4 
OLS Regressions on Non-Performing Asset Ratio 
Table 4 shows OLS regressions of non-performing asset ratio on the log of board size and asset size and board 
characteristics.  The non-performing assets ratio (NPAR) is calculated as the amount of non-performing assets over 
total assets.  CEO Power is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board of 
Directors.  CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has been on the board of directors.  BOD Tenure is the 
average number of years the board members have been on the board of directors.  The tenure of each director is 
calculated and then an average is taken of all of the directors.  A board member is defined as an insider if he is an 
employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as those board members that are not insiders, not formerly employed 
by the bank and not relatives of those that are currently employed by the bank.  Columns vary by the regressors they 
include.  Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% (*) - 10%. 
 Dependent Variable:  NPAR   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size -0.0058*** 
(-3.2265) 
-0.0058*** 
(-3.4511) 
-0.0052*** 
(-3.2308) 
-0.0052*** 
(-2.7831) 
-0.0059*** 
(-4.8472) 
-0.0059*** 
(-4.7988) 
Outsiders     -0.0069* 
(-2.0696) 
-0.0065 
(-2.0229) 
Insiders   0.0109 
(1.1691) 
0.0112 
(1.1272) 
  
Log Total Assets 0.0005* 
(1.8896) 
0.0005** 
(2.0065) 
0.0006** 
(2.1578) 
0.0006** 
(2.0878) 
0.0006** 
(2.0080) 
0.0006** 
(2.0244) 
CEO Power -0.0001 
(-0.0778) 
-0.0001 
(-0.0786) 
-0.0003 
(-0.3883) 
-0.0003 
(-0.2357) 
0.0001 
(0.0979) 
0.0000 
(-0.0296) 
CEO Tenure 0.0000 
(0.0945) 
  0.0000 
(-0.0925) 
0.0000 
(-0.3870) 
 
BOD Tenure  0.0000 
(0.1863) 
0.0000 
(0.1370) 
  0.0000 
(-0.0260) 
Constant 0.0135*** 
(4.1041) 
0.0131*** 
(3.3310) 
0.0094** 
(2.0970) 
0.0098** 
(2.3192) 
0.0183*** 
(3.5085) 
0.0178*** 
(3.2521) 
Sample Size 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
F-Statistic 5.7547 5.7653 5.2288 5.2277 5.4739 5.4434 
(P-Value) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
R-squared 0.0202 0.0202 0.0229 0.0228 0.0239 0.0238 
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Appendix - Table 5 
OLS Regressions on Net Charge-Offs Ratio 
Table 5 shows OLS regressions of net charge-offs ratio on the log of board size and asset size and board 
characteristics.  The net charge-offs ratio (NCOR) is calculated as the amount of net charge-offs over total assets.  
CEO Power is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO 
tenure is the number of years the CEO has been on the board of directors.  BOD Tenure is the average number of 
years the board members have been on the board of directors.  The tenure of each director is calculated and then an 
average is taken of all of the directors.  A board member is defined as an insider if he is an employee of the bank.  
Outsiders are classified as those board members that are not insiders, not formerly employed by the bank and not 
relatives of those that are currently employed by the bank.  Columns vary by the regressors they include.  
Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% (*) - 10%. 
 Dependent Variable:  NCOR   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size -0.0023*** 
(-4.0042) 
-0.0024*** 
(-3.9888) 
-0.0025*** 
(-3.8664) 
-0.0026*** 
(-4.0697) 
-0.0023*** 
(-3.8451) 
-0.0023*** 
(-3.8148) 
Outsiders     0.0017 
(1.0397) 
0.0025 
(1.5465) 
Insiders   -0.0031 
(-1.0180) 
-0.0043 
(-1.5678) 
  
Log Total Assets 0.0006*** 
(4.5505) 
0.0006*** 
(4.6678) 
0.0006*** 
(4.3312) 
0.0006*** 
(4.3736) 
0.0006*** 
(4.1803) 
0.0006*** 
(4.2477) 
CEO Power -0.0003 
(-0.6770) 
-0.0005 
(-1.3408) 
-0.0002 
(-0.5406) 
-0.0004 
(-1.0110) 
-0.0003 
(-0.7891) 
-0.0006 
(-1.4274) 
CEO Tenure 0.0000* 
(-1.7789) 
 0.0000 
(-1.4933) 
 0.0000 
(-1.7601) 
 
BOD Tenure  0.0000 
(-0.3182) 
 0.0000 
(-0.2689) 
 0.0000 
(-0.1511) 
Constant 0.0013 
(0.5700) 
0.0009 
(0.3305) 
0.0023 
(0.8505) 
0.0023 
(0.7897) 
0.0001 
(0.0381) 
-0.0009 
(-0.3336) 
Sample Size 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
F-Statistic 8.1355 7.0100 6.7012 6.0092 6.7251 6.0933 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.0283 0.0244 0.0291 0.0262 0.0292 0.0265 
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Chapter 2 
The Relationship between Boards of Directors and Risk-Taking: 
Evidence from Bank Holding Companies 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The recession of 2008 was started from a balance sheet crash.  This caused the financial 
system in the United States to collapse (or come close to collapsing).  Both of these events are 
perceived to have started with banks taking excessive risk. The board of directors is supposed to 
monitor the actions of bank management, so that it does not take excessive risk and make the 
banks vulnerable. Does the board of directors play this important role? The existing literature 
examined the relationship between BHC boards of directors and market risk.  However, none of 
the studies (to our knowledge) examine how board characteristics affect bank risk taking.  The 
most recent crash was due to a balance sheet problem in the whole industry.  The purpose of this 
paper is to determine the relationship between board characteristics and the BHC’s market risk 
and balance sheet risk.   
According to Mehran et al. (2011), there are two main differences in the corporate 
governance of bank holding companies (BHCs) from their non-financial counterparts.  BHCs 
have many more stakeholders than other firms; these include debtholders, depositors, and 
shareholders.  Also, bank business is opaque and complex and consists of more than 90 percent 
debt.  Thus, being in the banking business is risky.  
The amount of risk a BHC takes is monitored by the Fed, the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency (OCC), credit monitoring agencies, and its stakeholders.  Stakeholders and 
regulators rely on the board of directors which is expected to provide a critical monitoring role 
about the amount of risk a bank is taking.  A BHC that takes too much risk can become 
insolvent; with too little risk, there is no stock growth and shareholders are not happy.  Recently 
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we saw how vulnerable the U.S. economy became arguably from the poor decisions by our 
BHCs and the risks that they take.  We examine the role of the board and how it affects the bank 
risk during the crisis. 
Merton (1977) showed us that shareholders want banks to take more risk because the 
premium that is paid by the banks for deposit insurance is not based on how much risk the bank 
takes.  Deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and a premium is paid 
for this insurance by each bank.  However, even though the premiums were increased twice in 
1989 and 1991 to risk-adjusted premiums, they were not increased enough to reduce the “moral-
hazard” problem according to John et al., 1991. Similarly, Mehran et al. (2011) suggests that 
deposit insurance has allowed BHCs to increase their opportunities into more complex products, 
while regulators have not been able to keep up.  Marcus (1984) and Keeley (1990) argue that as 
long as the costs of financial distress are not larger than the benefits of increasing risk, 
shareholders will pressure the bank to increase risk.  If the firm takes on too much risk, the 
government will provide a “too big to fail” guarantee, as we saw in the most recent crisis.  BHCs 
may see this as another type of insurance and take an excessive amount of risk.   As such, board 
of directors can play an important monitoring role not offered by others.   
Following Bharati and Jia (2009), we include credit, liquidity, capital and operational risk 
measures in our analysis.  We also follow the papers of Pathan (2009), Minton et al. (2011) and 
Ni and Purda (2012) and examine market risk in our study; we further include additional board 
characteristic variables such as CEO power, CEO tenure and average board of director tenure. 
Our results support the previous studies that find board size negatively affects both market risk; 
we also find that board size negatively affects balance sheet risk.  We also discover mixed results 
regarding the CEO’s power.  We find CEO’s power can make the CEO riskier in terms of the 
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BHC’s capital ratio (or leverage), a more powerful CEO can also decrease the BHC’s operational 
risk.  This gives us evidence that it is easier for the more powerful CEO to cut costs and make 
the bank more profitable.  Finally, we find that board of director tenure reduces liquidity risk and 
increases market risk; it is seen by both depositors and investors as a form of weak corporate 
governance.  During the crisis, we again see board size reducing both market risk and balance 
sheet risk.   
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the literature review and 
hypotheses.  In section 3 we go over the data and methodology.  Section 4 examines the results 
and section 5 concludes. 
II. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) contend that as the board of directors get 
bigger, they become less effective; this is because free-riding problems will erupt and it will be 
harder for decisions to be made in a timely manner.   To the contrary, Booth et al. (2002), Adams 
and Mehran (2003) and Hayes et al. (2005) find statistical evidence that banks have larger boards 
than their non-financial counterparts.  So why do BHCs have larger boards?  Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1988), Yermack (1996), and Dalton et al. (1999) postulate that CEOs of complex 
firms need more advice on their many segments; board members offer experience and expertise.  
Since the deregulation of the banking industry, due to the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 and the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, BHCs have gotten larger and more diversified.  Adams and 
Mehran (2003) suggest three reasons that BHCs have bigger boards.  First, there is a positive 
relationship between board size and asset size.  Also, larger, diversified firms might need 
additional board members to help monitor management.  Finally, mergers and acquisitions 
within the industry may have resulted in banks having larger boards.   
37 
 
Board effectiveness has also been extensively studied.  Yermack (1996), Barnhart and 
Rosenstein (1998), Eisenberg et al. (1998), Bhagat and Black (2002), and Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2003) find a negative relationship between board size and firm performance.  They 
use industrial firms in their samples and proxy firm performance using Tobin’s Q and return on 
assets (ROA). Andres and Vallelado (2008), Coles et al. (2008) and Belkhir (2009) examine the 
relationship between BHC board size and firm performance; they all find a positive relationship.  
Adams and Mehran (2008) also support this positive relationship between board size and firm 
performance using a sample of 35 BHCs over the period from 1959 to 1999.  Proxies for firm 
performance are Tobin’s Q and ROA for all of these studies.  Conversely, Pathan et al. (2011) 
examines 212 BHCs from 1997 to 2004 and finds a negative relationship between board size and 
firm performance.   
Cheng (2008) examines the relationship between board size and firm performance 
variability and interestingly finds that as boards get larger, firm performance becomes less 
variable.  Pathan (2009) looks at whether having a larger board makes the BHC more or less 
risky.  They begin with 300 BHCs and follow them over the period 1997 to 2004.  Bank risk is 
proxied using total risk, or the standard deviation of its daily stock returns, idiosyncratic risk and 
systematic risk.  They find that larger, more independent boards decrease the BHC’s risk. Minton 
et al. (2011) examine a sample of BHCs over the 2003 – 2008 period to determine the 
relationship between the boards of directors and risk.  They find a negative relationship between 
board size and total risk.  The most recent study by Kryvko and Reichling (2012) examines 
European banks and also finds a negative relationship between board size and firm risk.  The 
common theme among all of the research on board size and risk is that large boards will decrease 
the firm’s risk.  Therefore, we make the following hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 1:  Larger boards will decrease the BHC’s risk. 
Fama and Jensen (1983), Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) and Linck et al. (2008) argue 
that banks with high information asymmetry may benefit from more insiders on their boards.  
However, they also argue that independent directors are better monitors of bank management 
than insiders and can be valuable due to their experience, expertise and connections.  Knyazeva 
et al. (2009) show that independent directors rely on their reputations as effective monitors in 
order to maintain their positions and obtain new ones; this may make them averse to high risk 
projects.  They postulate that outside directors do not own as many shares as insiders so there is a 
big downside to accepting a risky project and thus, not a very big upside. 
The relationship between board independence and firm performance has been empirically 
tested, but there is no consensus in the literature.  Baysinger and Butler (1985) and Pearce and 
Zahra (1992) find that the proportion of outsiders increases firm performance.  However, 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Mehran (1995), Yermack (1996), Klein (1998), Bhagat and 
Black (2002), Adams and Mehran (2008) and Francis et al. (2012) find no relationship between 
the proportion of outsiders and firm performance.  An early study by Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996) finds a negative relationship between the proportion of outsiders and Tobin’s Q.  Bhagat 
and Bolton (2008) find a negative relationship between board independence and future firm 
operating performance. 
One of the first studies to examine the relationship between risk and board independence 
was Anderson et al. (2004).  They proxy risk as the firm’s cost of debt; they find that the more 
independent the board, the lower the firm’s cost of debt.  Using market risk variables, Pathan 
(2009) finds that board independence and risk are negatively related.  A study by Faleye and 
Krishnan (2010) examines the relationship between BHCs boards of directors and their 
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borrowers.  They find that increasing the size of the board or the CEO’s power actually increases 
the bank’s risk, i.e. their borrowers’ credit ratings go down.  However, increasing the board’s 
independence will decrease the bank’s risk.  Minton et al. (2011) examines BHC from 2003 to 
2008 to determine the relationship between financial expertise of the board and risk-taking.  
They find that more independent boards are associated with lower levels of market risk.  Ni and 
Purda (2012) looks at the board of directors of over 2,000 companies in an effort to determine if 
there is a relationship between the independence of the board and the firm’s idiosyncratic risk.  
They find that companies with a greater proportion of independent directors have a lower 
idiosyncratic risk.  However, they omit financial companies from their sample.  We expect to 
find the same results as all of these studies; independent boards should decrease the BHC’s risk. 
Hypothesis 2:  More independent boards will decrease the BHC’s risk. 
Pathan and Skully (2010) argue that CEO power can be an advantage or a disadvantage 
to a bank.  The bank with high monitoring costs may benefit from the all-knowing CEO of a 
complex firm.  However, they also argue that the roles should be separated to ensure board 
independence and that the CEO receives no extra benefits.  According to Yermack (1996) and 
Larcker et al. (2007), CEO power is an indicator of weak corporate governance and reduces the 
independence of the board.  Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and Linck et al. (2008) find that the 
CEO gains power as they become chair of the board.  Pi and Timme (1993) examine the 
relationship between CEO power and return on assets; they find that ROA is lower when the 
CEO is also chairman.  Dechow et al. (1996) find that firms manipulating earnings are more 
likely to have a CEO that is also chairman.  Moreover, Goyal and Park (2002) find that the CEO 
is less likely to lose their job due to poor performance if they are also the chairman.  Bhagat and 
Bolton (2008) discover a negative relationship between CEO power and future operating 
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performance.  However, Adams et al. (2005) find no evidence that CEO power has a negative 
effect on firm performance.  A recent study by Van Ness et al. (2010) finds a positive 
relationship between CEO power and firm performance.  They hypothesize that the CEO who is 
also the chairman is a competent, reliable advocate for shareholders which leads to stronger firm 
performance.   
Adams et al. (2005) also examine the relationship between CEO power and stock return 
variability; they find a positive association.  Their study, however, ignores BHCs.  Pathan (2009) 
finds that CEO power decreases the BHC’s risk.  Thus, there is no consensus in the literature and 
we must hypothesize the null. 
Hypothesis 3:  CEO Power has no effect on the BHC’s risk. 
There are two theories regarding CEO or board of director tenure.  First is the expertise 
hypothesis which suggests that a longer term CEO or director may be an asset to the firm 
because they have more experience and knowledge.  Buchanan (1974) believes that directors 
with a longer tenure are more committed to the organization and toward company goals.  
Likewise, Pfeffer (1972) says that longer term directors should be more knowledgeable and 
effective than less senior directors.  Fiegener et al. (1996) examine the largest 89 BHCs in 1990 
and find that the board of directors’ tenure is positively related to financial performance.  They 
also suggest that a policy of “staggered replacement” to achieve tenure diversity has a positive 
effect on firm performance.  These results are replicated by Van Ness et al. (2010) using a 
sample of industrial firms from 2006 and 2007.   
On the other hand, the management friendliness hypothesis states that the longer term 
director is less likely to monitor because they are now too much of a friend to the firm.  This can 
lead to weak corporate governance.  Evidence of this hypothesis too has been plentiful.  Beasley 
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(1996) finds that it is positively associated with financial statement fraud.  Similarly, Vafeas 
(2005) finds director tenure is negatively associated with earnings quality.  Another Vafeas 
(2003) study concludes that directors with over twenty years of experience are more likely to be 
classified as a “gray” director, to serve on the nominating and compensation committees, and to 
inflate the CEO’s salary.  Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) study how the entrenchment of the board 
affects firm performance and find a negative relationship.   
Anderson et al. (2004) tests the relationship between board tenure and the cost of the 
firm’s debt as the proxy for risk.  They find that the more entrenched the board is, the more the 
debt costs, or the riskier the firm is perceived to be.  However, Kryvko and Reichling (2012) find 
that the CEO’s tenure decreases his propensity to take risks.  Therefore, since there is no 
consensus in the previous research, we must hypothesize the null, that there is no relationship 
between CEO power and BHC risk. 
Hypothesis 4:  There is no effect between CEO / board tenure and BHC risk.     
III. Data and Methodology 
 
Our sample is obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s Bank Holding 
Company database.  The database contains all information that banks reported on form FR-Y-
9C, the consolidated balance sheet and income statements of the bank holding company, to the 
Federal Reserve Board since 1986.  Annual stock returns must be available and are obtained 
from Center for Research and Security Prices (CRSP).  Also, proxy statements have to be 
available either through Lexis-Nexis or the SEC website.  The largest 150 BHCs were selected in 
1999 and followed through to 2009.  The number of banks reduces over time due to 
consolidation or bank failure.  The final sample consists of 1,124 observations over the eleven 
year period from 1999 to 2009.     
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We proxy credit risk by calculating the noncurrent loan ratio, which is the ratio of 
noncurrent loans to total loans and leases.  Noncurrent loans is the sum of loans that are more 
than 90 days past due and those that are not accruing interest.  Liquidity risk is measured as the 
ratio of core deposits to total assets.  The capital ratio is the ratio of total equity to total assets.  
Operational risk is measured by the ratio of personal expenses to the number of employees.  
Personal expenses include all salaries and benefits paid to employees of the bank.  CEO Power is 
a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  
CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has been on the board of directors.  BOD Tenure is 
the average number of years the board members have been on the board of directors.  The tenure 
of each director is calculated and then an average is taken of all of the directors.  A board 
member is defined as an insider if he is an employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as 
those board members that are not insiders, not formerly employed by the bank and not relatives 
of those that are currently employed by the bank. 
Following Pathan (2009), we use the two-index model from Chen et al. (2006) and 
Anderson and Fraser (2000), and estimate each year for each bank:  
 Rit = αi + β1i Rmt +  β2i INTERESTt + εit  
where i and t denote bank i and time t respectively,  
R is the bank’s equity return, 
Rm is the return on the S&P 500 market index;  
INTEREST is the yield on the three-month Treasury bill rate;  
α is the intercept term;  
ε is the residuals;  
β1i is the systemic risk of bank i; 
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Summary statistics are shown in Table 1.  The average board size for a BHC in our 
sample is 13.59 with 78.3% outsiders and 12.8% insiders.  60% of CEOs are also Chairman of 
the board of directors and the CEO has been on the board an average of 12.26 years.  The board 
of directors has been on the job for an average of 9.81 years.  The BHC in our sample has an 
average of $36.8 m in assets.  Table 2 shows correlations between the board composition and 
total asset variables.  There do not appear to be any multicollinearity problems. 
We consider three different market risk proxies; they are systematic risk (BETAM), 
idiosyntratic risk (IR) and total market risk (STDEV). We test three models to examine how 
board characteristics influence market risk. 
BETAM = a + B1LOG(BOARDSIZE) + B2OUTSIDERS + B3LOG(TOTALASSETS) + 
B4CEOPOWER + B5CEOTENURE + B6BODTENURE + e 
IR = a + B1LOG(BOARDSIZE) + B2OUTSIDERS + B3LOG(TOTALASSETS) + 
B4CEOPOWER + B5CEOTENURE + B6BODTENURE + e 
STDEV = a + B1LOG(BOARDSIZE) + B2OUTSIDERS + B3LOG(TOTALASSETS) + 
B4CEOPOWER + B5CEOTENURE + B6BODTENURE + e 
Here, OUTSIDERS is the proportion of outside directors on the board; LOG(TOTALASSETS) 
is the log of total assets ; CEOPOWER is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is also chair 
of the board; CEOTENURE is the number of years the CEO has been on the board of directors; 
BODTENURE is the average of the tenure of each board member and LOG(BOARDSIZE) is the 
log of board size. 
 Further we proxy balance-sheet risk-taking using the variables of Bharati and Jia (2009).  
Using these as the dependent variables, we test four different specifications: 
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CR = a + B1LOG(BOARDSIZE) + B2OUTSIDERS + B3LOG(TOTALASSETS) + 
B4CEOPOWER + B5CEOTENURE + B6BODTENURE + e 
LR = a + B1LOG(BOARDSIZE) + B2OUTSIDERS + B3LOG(TOTALASSETS) + 
B4CEOPOWER + B5CEOTENURE + B6BODTENURE + e 
CAPR = a + B1LOG(BOARDSIZE) + B2OUTSIDERS + B3LOG(TOTALASSETS) + 
B4CEOPOWER + B5CEOTENURE + B6BODTENURE + e 
OR = a + B1LOG(BOARDSIZE) + B2OUTSIDERS + B3LOG(TOTALASSETS) + 
B4CEOPOWER + B5CEOTENURE + B6BODTENURE + e 
Here, CR implies credit risk;  LR is liquidity risk; CAPR is capital risk and OR is operational 
risk. 
IV. Results 
 
a. Panel Estimation Results 
The results presented in table 3 to 9 are estimated with year and firm fixed effects1. The 
results of the regressions on credit risk are shown in Table 3.  We see that board size negatively 
effects credit risk, which is the ratio of noncurrent loans to total loans and leases.  Table 4 shows 
the results using liquidity risk as the dependent variable.  We can see that as the board gets 
larger, the liquidity risk increases.  However, remember that we define liquidity risk as core 
deposits divided by total assets.  This just shows us that these banks are paying for their assets 
with more deposits.  CEO tenure seems to increase core deposits also.  Perhaps this is because 
people are more eager to put their deposits at a bank with an experienced CEO.  To the contrary, 
board of director tenure has the opposite effect; a longer tenure seems to decrease the amount of 
deposits at the bank.  We believe that this may be due to depositors seeing the directors as 
entrenched and not in an advisory role.    
                                                          
1
 We have performed Hausman Test and LR test to verify the validity of our specification. 
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In Table 5 we present the results of the regressions using the capital ratio as the 
dependent variable.  The capital ratio is the ratio of total equity to total assets.  Interestingly, we 
find that the more powerful a CEO, the less equity the bank has or the more leveraged the bank 
is.  We also see that the more insiders on the board the capital risk increases.  The results in 
Table 6 suggest that board size, CEO power and CEO tenure all decrease the BHC’s operational 
risk.  Operational risk is the ratio of personal expenses divided by the number of employees; if 
this number decreases then the bank’s profitability will increase.  A larger board may encourage 
cost cutting measures and maybe this is the reason why they are affiliated with positive firm 
performance reported by the previous studies (Adams and Mehran, 2008; Andres and Vallelado, 
2008; Coles et al., 2008, Belkhir, 2009).  CEO power and CEO tenure both represent the CEO’s 
power.  This power will enable him to cut costs wherever is necessary without much fight.  We 
also see a positive relationship between board independence and operational risk.  It is possible 
that a more independent board will fight for the BHC’s employee salaries and benefits. 
Table 7 first shows us that board size decreases market risk. It is plausible that investors 
believe with large number of directors monitoring the managers, it will be difficult for banks to 
take excessive market risk.   We also find that board independence increases market risk, and the 
proportion of insiders decreases market risk.  This result coincides with the belief that bank 
business is complex and has a high degree of information asymmetry and that insiders are 
needed on the board to explain to outsiders the inner workings of the bank.  Next we see that 
board of director tenure increases market risk.  This result actually confirms the result we saw in 
Table 4 that board of director tenure decreases the amount of deposits at the bank.  The market 
may perceive this as entrenchment of the board, thus accordingly perceive lax monitoring from 
the board and identify these banks as more risky.  In Table 8 we present the results of the 
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regressions using idiosyncratic risk as the dependent variable; none of the independent variables 
can explain the variation of the dependent variable.  Thus, the total risk inherent in the BHC 
stock is driven mainly from the market, not from any firm specific risk.  The results in Table 9 
show that board size has a negative effect on the standard deviation or total risk of the BHC.  We 
again see that board independence has a positive effect on total risk. 
Our results support our hypothesis that board size reduces the risk of the BHC; thus, 
supporting the findings of Cheng (2008), Pathan (2009), Minton et al. (2011) and Kryvko and 
Reichling (2012).  We do not, however, support their results regarding board independence.  We 
find a positive relationship between board independence and operational risk, market risk and 
total risk.  Our CEO power results are mixed.  We can, however, reject our hypothesis that CEO 
power has no effect on the BHC’s risk.  While the CEO with power increases some risk proxies, 
he decreases others.  Kryvko and Reichling (2012) find that CEO power decreases his propensity 
to take risks; we found evidence of this with operational risk, but not with the capital ratio.  The 
CEO with power was more likely to make the BHC more leveraged.  Our results contradict those 
of Adams et al. (2005) and Pathan (2009); we find no relationship between market risk and CEO 
power.  Finally, our results regarding the relationship between CEO / board tenure and risk 
support the results of Anderson et al. (2004).  We find that a longer CEO / board tenure results in 
higher balance sheet risk and market risk.               
b. Results during the crisis 
 
As shown in Table 10, we find that during the crisis credit risk increases.  However, we 
see that large boards lower credit risk during the crisis.  We also see that board independence 
lowers credit risk.  Table 11 shows us the results of regressions on liquidity risk during the crisis.  
Here we see that larger boards decrease liquidity risk during the crisis; however, as explained, 
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liquidity risk is just the ratio of core deposits to total assets.  It may be that depositors took their 
deposits from larger, riskier banks, i.e. larger boards and brought them to smaller, safer banks 
with a smaller board during the crisis.  We also see here that CEO power during the crisis has a 
positive effect on liquidity risk.  Depositors may see the CEO with power as able to “weather 
them through the storm” and trust him.  On the other hand, we find that CEO tenure has a 
negative effect on liquidity risk during the crisis. This is an interesting finding; it implies that we 
see that banks with more seasoned CEOs had higher core deposits during the crisis.  
Table 12 presents the results of regressions on the capital ratio.  Here we can see that 
board independence and CEO power actually increases the capital ratio during the crisis.  The 
first result is intuitive, that during the crisis board independence has played their monitoring role 
as expected. However the second result may seem a bit counter intuitive, however, as it implies 
that CEO power somehow allows increasing capital.  Regressions on operational risk during the 
crisis are shown in Table 13.  We see that board size increases operational risk during the crisis. 
Now we turn our attention to market risk variables.  We see in Table 14 that no board 
characteristics affect the market risk of the BHC during the crisis.  However, in Table 15, we see 
the board size negatively affects idiosyncratic risk during the crisis.  Evidently during the crisis, 
investors see a large board as a riskier firm.  Since no board characteristics affected the market 
risk of the BHC, all of the total risk is coming from the idiosyncratic risk.  Table 16 shows this 
effect.  Again, we see that only board size is negatively affecting total risk during the crisis. 
 Overall, our findings show that board size negatively effects credit risk, liquidity risk, 
idiosyncratic risk and total risk during the crisis.  One exception is that board size increases 
operational risk during the crisis.  Board independence negatively effects credit and liquidity 
risks during the crisis, but positively affects the capital ratio during the crisis.  CEO power is 
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shown to have a positive effect on liquidity risk and the capital ratio during the crisis.  CEO 
tenure has a negative effect on liquidity risk during the crisis. 
V. Conclusion 
 
 Much of the previous research has examined the relationship between board 
characteristics and the BHC’s market risk. Arguably the recent financial crisis started with banks 
taking excessive balance sheet risk. The purpose of the bank board is to monitor the major 
decisions taken by managers. In this paper we examine whether board characteristics influence 
how much balance sheet risk a BHC takes.  We use four accounting based proxies for bank risk-
taking including credit risk, liquidity risk, capital ratio and operational risk.  We add to the 
previous research on the relationship of BHC market risk and board characteristics by including 
other variables such as CEO and board tenure in the analysis.  As in these studies, we use three 
market based proxies for bank risk including systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk and the total risk 
of its stock return.   
  Our study contributes to the literature in several ways.  We are the first study to examine 
the relationship between board characteristics and balance sheet risk.  We find that board size 
reduces both market risk and balance sheet risk.  Second, we find that our results are robust 
during the crisis.  Even during the crisis, a large board reduced market risk and balance sheet 
risk.  We find that board independence increases operational risk and market risk.  We find that a 
CEO with power is more likely to increase the leverage of the firm.  Finally, we find that 
increases in board of director tenure increases both balance sheet risk and market risk.  This 
should have serious implications to our regulators.  If we force separations of the CEO and 
chairman positions as well as place a limit on how long a board member can serve on the board 
of directors of a BHC, we should see the bank’s risk profile decrease.   
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 One area for future research that should be explored is how outside financial experts on 
the board of directors affect the balance sheet and market risk of the BHC.  A financial expert 
may be seen as an asset to the board because BHCs are so complex and opaque.  It is also 
possible that this person could take some of the power away from the CEO, reduce board of 
director tenure and thus decrease the amount of BHC market and balance sheet risk.         
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics for Sample of BHCs from 1999 to 2009 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for select financial variables, board size and board composition and control 
variables for our sample from 1999 to 2009.  Our sample consists of 1124 observations from 150 BHCs.  All 
financial variables were collected from Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies (Form FR-
Y-9C) from the Federal Reserve Board.  Proxy statement data was collected from SEC database.  Standard deviation 
is the standard deviation of the banks’ daily stock returns.  Using the two-index model from Chen et006) and 
Anderson and Fraser (2000), we  estimate each year for each bank:  Rit = αi + β1i Rmt +  β2i INTERESTt + εit Where i 
and t denote bank i and time t respectively, R is the bank’s equity return, Rm is the return on the S&P 500 market 
index; INTEREST is the yield on the three-month Treasury bill rate; α is the intercept term; ε is the residuals; β1i is 
the systemic risk of bank i (this is what we call Beta M and use as the dependent variable in these models);  while 
idiosyncratic risk is the standard deviation of the residuals for each year.  We proxy credit risk by calculating the 
noncurrent loan ratio, which is the ratio of noncurrent loans to total loans and leases.  Noncurrent loans is the sum of 
loans that are more than 90 days past due and those that are not accruing interest.  Liquidity risk is measured as the 
ratio of core deposits to total assets.  The capital ratio is the ratio of total equity to total assets.  Operational risk is 
measured by the ratio of personal expenses to the number of employees.  Personal expenses include all salaries and 
benefits paid to employees of the bank.  CEO Power is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also 
Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has been on the board of directors.  
BOD Tenure is the average number of years the board members have been on the board of directors.  The tenure of 
each director is calculated and then an average is taken of all of the directors.  A board member is defined as an 
insider if he is an employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as those board members that are not insiders, not 
formerly employed by the bank and not relatives of those that are currently employed by the bank.   
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: Market Variables      
Standard Deviation 1124 0.0239 0.0149 0.0065 0.1145 
Beta M 1124 1.0788 0.5574 -0.1827 3.1363 
Idiosyncratic 1124 0.0006 0.0009 0.0000 0.0112 
      
Panel B: Accounting Risk Variables      
Credit Risk 1123 0.0131 0.0229 0.0000 0.5360 
Liquidity Risk 1124 0.1986 0.1049 0.0000 0.6169 
Capital Ratio 1124 0.0893 0.0227 0.0095 0.4684 
Operational Risk 1124 58.4679 19.4723 1.2788 189.6206 
      
Panel C: Corporate Governance Variables      
Board Size 1124 13.5908 4.3028 5 32 
Board Tenure 1124 9.8131 3.0744 1.6800 21.2222 
CEO Power 1124 0.6005 0.4900 0 1 
CEO Tenure 1124 12.2651 8.6596 0 50 
Outsiders 1124 0.7838 0.1144 0.3125 1 
Insiders 1124 0.1280 0.0622 0 0.4375 
      
Panel D: Asset Size      
Total Assets 1124 36821183 1.38E+08 875504 2.22E+09 
Log Total Assets 1124 16.04163 1.4094 13.6826 21.5228 
 
 
 
51 
 
Table 2 
Correlation of Corporate Governance Variables and Asset Size 
Table 2 shows correlation between corporate governance variables and asset size variables.  CEO Power is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the board of directors.  CEO tenure is the number of 
years the CEO has been on the board of directors.  Board Tenure is the average number of years the board members 
have been on the board of directors.  The tenure of each director is calculated and then an average is taken of all of 
the directors.  A board member is defined as an Insider if he is an employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as 
those board members that are not insiders, not formerly employed by the bank and not relatives of those that are 
currently employed by the bank.   
Variable Board Size Board 
Tenure 
CEO 
Power 
CEO 
Tenure 
Outsiders Insiders Total 
Assets 
Board Tenure -0.1148       
CEO Power 0.1122 0.0767      
CEO Tenure 0.0322 0.4727 0.3052     
Outsiders -0.0376 -0.1564 0.0638 -0.2607    
Insiders -0.2669 0.1044 0.1170 0.2450 -0.5886   
Total Assets 0.1440 -0.1314 0.1216 -0.0747 0.1452 -0.1382  
Log Total 
Assets 
0.2871 -0.0787 0.3187 0.0166 0.1383 -0.1574 0.5697 
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Table 3 
Fixed Effects Regressions on Credit Risk 
  
Table 3 shows fixed effects regressions of credit risk on the log of board size and asset size and board characteristics.  
We proxy credit risk by calculating the noncurrent loan ratio; this is the ratio of noncurrent loans to total loans and 
leases.  Noncurrent loans is the sum of loans that are more than 90 days past due and those that are not accruing 
interest.  CEO Power is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board of 
Directors.  CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has been on the board of directors.  BOD Tenure is the 
average number of years the board members have been on the board of directors.  The tenure of each director is 
calculated and then an average is taken of all of the directors.  A board member is defined as an insider if he is an 
employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as those board members that are not insiders, not formerly employed 
by the bank and not relatives of those that are currently employed by the bank.    Columns vary by the regressors they 
include.  Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% (*) - 10%. 
 
 Dependent Variable:  Credit Risk   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size -0.0077** 
(-2.5011) 
-0.0072** 
(-2.2836) 
-0.0074** 
(-2.3500) 
-0.0067** 
(-2.0880) 
-0.0081*** 
(-2.6510) 
-0.0075** 
(-2.4720) 
Outsiders   0.0075 
(0.9905) 
0.0086 
(1.1072) 
  
Insiders     -0.0118 
(-1.0883) 
-0.0126 
(-1.0847) 
Log Total Assets 0.0046*** 
(3.7932) 
0.0048*** 
(4.0918) 
0.0046*** 
(3.7895) 
0.0047*** 
(4.0777) 
0.0045*** 
(3.6548) 
0.0046*** 
(3.8702) 
CEO Power -0.0009 
(-0.4282) 
-0.0015 
(-0.9567) 
-0.0010 
(-0.5118) 
-0.0016 
(-1.0115) 
-0.0007 
(-0.3458) 
-0.0012 
(-0.7602) 
CEO Tenure -0.0007 
(-0.5698) 
 -0.0005 
(-0.4554) 
 -0.0006 
(-0.4669) 
 
BOD Tenure  0.0003 
(1.2450) 
 0.0003 
(1.3503) 
 0.0003 
(1.2059) 
Constant -0.0400*** 
(-2.6004) 
-0.0468*** 
(-3.2796) 
-0.0468*** 
(-2.8899) 
-0.0547*** 
(-3.6827) 
-0.0364*** 
(-2.2494) 
-0.0424*** 
(-2.7065) 
Sample Size 1123 1123 1123 1123 1123 1123 
F-Statistic 2.8931 2.8983 2.8757 2.8845 2.8736 2.8800 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.2501 0.2505 0.2508 0.2514 0.2507 0.2511 
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Table 4 
Fixed Effects Regressions on Liquidity Risk 
  
Table 4 shows fixed effects regressions of liquidity risk on the log of board size and asset size and board 
characteristics.  Liquidity risk is measured as the ratio of core deposits to total assets.  CEO Power is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO tenure is the number of 
years the CEO has been on the board of directors.  BOD Tenure is the average number of years the board members 
have been on the board of directors.  The tenure of each director is calculated and then an average is taken of all of 
the directors.  A board member is defined as an insider if he is an employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as 
those board members that are not insiders, not formerly employed by the bank and not relatives of those that are 
currently employed by the bank.    Columns vary by the regressors they include.  Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) 
- 5% (*) - 10%. 
 
 Dependent Variable:  Liquidity Risk   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size 0.0304*** 
(2.7409) 
0.0250** 
(2.1714) 
0.0331*** 
(2.9211) 
0.0273** 
(2.3183) 
0.0285*** 
(2.5935) 
0.0233** 
(2.0281) 
Outsiders   0.0591** 
(2.0673) 
0.0468 
(1.6218) 
  
Insiders     -0.0682 
(-1.3206) 
-0.0580 
(-1.1228) 
Log Total Assets -0.0271*** 
(-7.9314) 
-0.0283*** 
(-8.2366) 
-0.0271*** 
(-8.0247) 
-0.0282*** 
(-8.3228) 
-0.0277*** 
(-8.0257) 
-0.0288*** 
(-8.2887) 
CEO Power -0.0019 
(-0.3057) 
0.0038 
(0.6937) 
-0.0031 
(-0.4954) 
0.0034 
(0.6252) 
-0.0010 
(-0.1602) 
0.0051 
(0.8902) 
CEO Tenure 0.0006 
(1.6114) 
 0.0007* 
(1.9335) 
 0.0007* 
(1.8332) 
 
BOD Tenure  -0.0027** 
(-2.5038) 
 -0.0026** 
(-2.3733) 
 -0.0027** 
(-2.5311) 
Constant 0.5494*** 
(10.5687) 
0.6118*** 
(10.8351) 
0.4957*** 
(8.5090) 
0.5690*** 
(9.1051) 
0.5706*** 
(10.6110) 
0.6320*** 
(10.7158) 
Sample Size 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
F-Statistic 12.9964 13.0819 12.9805 13.0266 12.9175 12.9909 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.5995 0.6011 0.6015 0.6024 0.6004 0.6017 
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Table 5 
Fixed Effects Regressions on Capital Ratio 
   
Table 5 shows fixed effects regressions of capital ratio on the log of board size and asset size and board 
characteristics.  The capital ratio is the ratio of total equity to total assets.  CEO Power is a dummy variable that takes 
a value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has 
been on the board of directors.  BOD Tenure is the average number of years the board members have been on the 
board of directors.  The tenure of each director is calculated and then an average is taken of all of the directors.  A 
board member is defined as an insider if he is an employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as those board 
members that are not insiders, not formerly employed by the bank and not relatives of those that are currently 
employed by the bank.    Columns vary by the regressors they include.  Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% (*) 
- 10%. 
 
 Dependent Variable:  Capital Ratio   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size -0.0015 
(-0.3528) 
-0.0019 
(-0.4461) 
-0.0011 
(-0.2616) 
0.0016 
(-0.3677) 
-0.0022 
(-0.5199) 
-0.0026 
(-0.6006) 
Outsiders   0.0082 
(1.1378) 
0.0067 
(0.9202) 
  
Insiders     -0.0254* 
(-1.8758) 
-0.0233* 
(-1.7158) 
Log Total Assets 0.0025** 
(2.3025) 
0.0024** 
(2.2446) 
0.0025** 
(2.3068) 
0.0023** 
(2.2424) 
0.0023** 
(2.0703) 
0.0021** 
(1.9955) 
CEO Power -0.0072*** 
(-3.5097) 
-0.0065*** 
(-3.4114) 
-0.0074*** 
(-3.6404) 
-0.0065*** 
(-3.4635) 
-0.0069*** 
(-3.2592) 
-0.0060*** 
(-2.9990) 
CEO Tenure 0.0009 
(1.0494) 
 0.0001 
(1.2448) 
 0.0001 
(1.4077) 
 
BOD Tenure  -0.0002 
(-0.7823) 
 -0.0002 
(-0.7131) 
 -0.0002 
(-0.8335) 
Constant 0.0565*** 
(3.8240) 
0.0626*** 
(4.1223) 
0.0491*** 
(3.0995) 
0.0565*** 
(3.4610) 
0.0644*** 
(4.0039) 
0.0707*** 
(4.2356) 
Sample Size 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
F-Statistic 3.2293 3.2267 3.2112 3.2387 3.2387 3.2305 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.2711 0.2710 0.2720 0.2736 0.2736 0.2731 
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Table 6 
Fixed Effects Regressions on Operational Risk 
  
Table 6 shows fixed effects regressions of operational risk on the log of board size and asset size and board 
characteristics.  Operational risk is measured by the ratio of personal expenses to the number of employees.  Personal 
expenses include all salaries and benefits paid to employees of the bank.  CEO Power is a dummy variable that takes 
a value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has 
been on the board of directors.  BOD Tenure is the average number of years the board members have been on the 
board of directors.  The tenure of each director is calculated and then an average is taken of all of the directors.  A 
board member is defined as an insider if he is an employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as those board 
members that are not insiders, not formerly employed by the bank and not relatives of those that are currently 
employed by the bank.    Columns vary by the regressors they include.  Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% (*) 
- 10%. 
 
 Dependent Variable:  Operational Risk   
Independent 
Variable 
I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size -13.6673*** 
(-6.1722) 
-13.5960*** 
(-5.9242) 
-13.0056*** 
(-5.7801) 
-12.8151*** 
(-5.4777) 
-13.8415*** 
(-6.2561) 
-13.8788*** 
(-6.0428) 
Outsiders   14.8680*** 
(3.1213) 
16.3305*** 
(3.3804) 
  
Insiders     -6.2695 
(-0.6656) 
-9.4625 
(-0.9976) 
Log Total Assets 5.1720*** 
(7.2777) 
5.2826*** 
(7.4697) 
5.1703*** 
(7.2320) 
5.2688*** 
(7.4052) 
5.1196*** 
(7.0969) 
5.1940*** 
(7.2300) 
CEO Power -2.3095* 
(-1.7280) 
-3.4308*** 
(-2.8833) 
-2.6052* 
(-1.9737) 
-3.5597*** 
(-3.0181) 
-2.2280 
(-1.6310) 
-3.2294*** 
(-2.6081) 
CEO Tenure -0.1678** 
(-2.4944) 
 -0.1382** 
(-2.0808) 
 -0.1606** 
(-2.4166) 
 
BOD Tenure  -0.0423 
(-0.2232) 
 0.0034 
(0.0183) 
 -0.0048 
(-0.2527) 
Constant 13.9481 
(1.3533) 
11.02158 
(1.0325) 
0.4423 
(0.0379) 
-3.9282 
(-0.3237) 
15.8997 
(1.4682) 
14.3118 
(1.2746) 
Sample Size 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
F-Statistic 10.8518 10.7419 10.1000 10.8358 10.7573 10.6601 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.5556 0.5531 0.5592 0.5576 0.5558 0.5535 
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Table 7 
Fixed Effects Regressions on Beta M 
  
Table 7 shows fixed effects regressions of Beta M on the log of board size and asset size and board characteristics.  
Using the two-index model from Chen et al. (2006) and Anderson and Fraser (2000), we  estimate each year for 
each bank:  Rit = αi + β1i Rmt +  β2i INTERESTt + εit Where i and t denote bank i and time t respectively, R is the 
bank’s equity return, Rm is the return on the S&P 500 market index; INTEREST is the yield on the three-month 
Treasury bill rate; α is the intercept term; ε is the residuals; β1i is the systemic risk of bank i (this is what we call 
Beta M and use as the dependent variable in these models);  while idiosyncratic risk is the standard deviation of the 
residuals for each year.  CEO Power is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the 
Board of Directors.  CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has been on the board of directors.  BOD Tenure is 
the average number of years the board members have been on the board of directors.  The tenure of each director is 
calculated and then an average is taken of all of the directors.  A board member is defined as an insider if he is an 
employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as those board members that are not insiders, not formerly employed 
by the bank and not relatives of those that are currently employed by the bank.    Columns vary by the regressors 
they include.  Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% (*) - 10%. 
 
 Dependent Variable:  Beta M   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size -0.4564*** 
(-6.1572) 
-0.4199*** 
(-5.5585) 
-0.4162*** 
(-5.6367) 
-0.3743*** 
(-4.9883) 
-0.4955*** 
(-6.7524) 
-0.4617*** 
(-6.1635) 
Outsiders   0.9049*** 
(4.6531) 
0.9520*** 
(4.9753) 
  
Insiders     -1.4047*** 
(-4.0058) 
-1.4016*** 
(-4.0183) 
Log Total Assets 0.2424*** 
(10.4597) 
0.2492*** 
(10.6768) 
0.2423*** 
(10.3632) 
0.2484*** 
(10.5590) 
0.2307*** 
(9.8696) 
0.2360*** 
(10.0196) 
CEO Power -0.0413 
(-0.8877) 
-0.0700 
(-1.6119) 
-0.0593 
(-1.2789) 
-0.0775* 
(-1.8092) 
-0.0231 
(-0.4998) 
-0.0402 
(-0.9312) 
CEO Tenure -0.0026 
(-0.9577) 
 -0.0008 
(-0.2904) 
 -0.0010 
(-0.3538) 
 
BOD Tenure  0.0189** 
(2.5067) 
 0.0216*** 
(2.9010) 
 0.0181* 
(2.4113) 
Constant -1.5846*** 
(-4.3637) 
-1.9867*** 
(-5.1308) 
-2.4066*** 
(-5.8112) 
-2.8582*** 
(-6.6280) 
-1.1473*** 
(-3.0250) 
-1.4993*** 
(-3.6754) 
Sample Size 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
F-Statistic 2.2858 2.5440 2.7041 2.7956 2.6444 2.7073 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.2226 0.2266 0.2393 0.2454 0.2352 0.2395 
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Table 8 
Fixed Effects Regressions on Idiosyncratic Risk 
  
Table 8 shows fixed effects regressions of Beta M on the log of board size and asset size and board characteristics.  
Using the two-index model from Chen et al. (2006) and Anderson and Fraser (2000), we  estimate each year for 
each bank:  Rit = αi + β1i Rmt +  β2i INTERESTt + εit Where i and t denote bank i and time t respectively, R is the 
bank’s equity return, Rm is the return on the S&P 500 market index; INTEREST is the yield on the three-month 
Treasury bill rate; α is the intercept term; ε is the residuals; β1i is the systemic risk of bank i (this is what we call 
Beta M and use as the dependent variable in these models);  while idiosyncratic risk is the standard deviation of the 
residuals for each year.  CEO Power is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the 
Board of Directors.  CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has been on the board of directors.  BOD Tenure is 
the average number of years the board members have been on the board of directors.  The tenure of each director is 
calculated and then an average is taken of all of the directors.  A board member is defined as an insider if he is an 
employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as those board members that are not insiders, not formerly employed 
by the bank and not relatives of those that are currently employed by the bank.    Columns vary by the regressors 
they include.  Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% (*) - 10%. 
 
 Dependent Variable:  Idiosyncratic Risk   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size -0.0002 
(-1.3980) 
-0.0002 
(-1.2790) 
-0.0002 
(-1.2281) 
-0.0001 
(-1.0828) 
-0.0002 
(-1.5770) 
-0.0002 
(-1.4731) 
Outsiders   0.0005 
(1.4455) 
0.0005 
(1.6036) 
  
Insiders     -0.0007 
(-1.0806) 
-0.0007 
(-1.1705) 
Log Total Assets 0.0001*** 
(2.7929) 
0.0001*** 
(2.9021) 
0.0001*** 
(2.7930) 
0.0001*** 
(2.8933) 
0.0001*** 
(2.7120) 
0.0001*** 
(2.7986) 
CEO Power -0.0005 
(-0.6290) 
-0.0008 
(-1.1299) 
-0.0006 
(-0.7471) 
0.0000 
(-1.1868) 
-0.0004 
(-0.5531) 
-0.0001 
(-0.9984) 
CEO Tenure 0.0000 
(-0.9814) 
 0.0000 
(-0.7620) 
 0.0000 
(-0.8466) 
 
BOD Tenure  0.0000 
(0.3838) 
 0.0000 
(0.4968) 
 0.0000 
(0.3861) 
Constant -0.0007 
(-1.1225) 
-0.0009 
(-1.3456) 
-0.0011 
(-1.6380) 
-0.0014 
(-1.8892) 
-0.0005 
(-0.8507) 
-0.0006 
(-1.0230) 
Sample Size 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
F-Statistic 2.1918 2.1830 2.1933 2.1897 2.1844 2.1788 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.2016 0.2009 0.2032 0.2030 0.2026 0.2022 
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Table 9 
Fixed Effects Regressions on Standard Deviation 
  
Table 9 shows fixed effects regressions of standard deviation on the log of board size and asset size and board 
characteristics.  Standard deviation is the standard deviation of the banks’ daily stock returns.  CEO Power is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO tenure is the 
number of years the CEO has been on the board of directors.  BOD Tenure is the average number of years the board 
members have been on the board of directors.  The tenure of each director is calculated and then an average is taken 
of all of the directors.  A board member is defined as an insider if he is an employee of the bank.  Outsiders are 
classified as those board members that are not insiders, not formerly employed by the bank and not relatives of those 
that are currently employed by the bank.    Columns vary by the regressors they include.  Significance levels:  (***) - 
1% (**) - 5% (*) - 10%. 
 
 Dependent Variable:  Standard Deviation   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size -0.0042** 
(-1.9643) 
-0.0037* 
(-1.7118) 
-0.0037* 
(-1.7248) 
-0.0032 
(-1.4341) 
-0.0044** 
(-2.0792) 
-0.0039* 
(-1.8302) 
Outsiders   0.0112** 
(2.0566) 
0.0124** 
(2.2936) 
  
Insiders     -0.0041 
(-0.4097) 
-0.0055 
(-0.5494) 
Log Total Assets 0.0028*** 
(4.3159) 
0.0030*** 
(4.4995) 
0.0029*** 
(4.3208) 
0.0030*** 
(4.4932) 
0.0028*** 
(4.1766) 
0.0029*** 
(4.3236) 
CEO Power -0.0012 
(-0.9153) 
-0.0019* 
(-1.6090) 
-0.0014 
(-1.0842) 
-0.0020* 
(-1.6925) 
-0.0011 
(-0.8864) 
-0.0018 
(-1.5598) 
CEO Tenure 0.0000 
(-1.2235) 
 0.0000 
(-0.9144) 
 -0.0001 
(-1.1395) 
 
BOD Tenure  0.0002 
(1.0513) 
 0.0002 
(1.2134) 
 0.0002 
(1.0835) 
Constant -0.0095 
(-0.9191) 
-0.0156 
(-1.4274) 
-0.0197 
(-1.7198) 
-0.0269** 
(-2.2507) 
-0.0082 
(-0.7828) 
-0.0137 
(-1.2197) 
Sample Size 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
F-Statistic 1.5876 1.5836 1.6152 1.6217 1.5742 1.5718 
(P-Value) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
R-squared 0.1546 0.1543 0.1581 0.1587 0.1548 0.1546 
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Table 10 
OLS Regressions on Credit Risk Including Crisis Dummy 
  
Table 10 shows OLS regressions of credit risk on the log of board size and asset size and board characteristics when 
we include a dummy for the recent financial crisis.  We do this to determine if there was a significant change in our 
results due to the financial crisis.  We proxy credit risk by calculating the noncurrent loan ratio, which is the ratio of 
noncurrent loans to total loans and leases.  Noncurrent loans is the sum of loans that are more than 90 days past due 
and those that are not accruing interest.  CEO Power is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also 
Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has been on the board of directors.  
BOD Tenure is the average number of years the board members have been on the board of directors.  The tenure of 
each director is calculated and then an average is taken of all of the directors.  A board member is defined as an 
insider if he is an employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as those board members that are not insiders, not 
formerly employed by the bank and not relatives of those that are currently employed by the bank.  Columns vary by 
the regressors they include.  Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% (*) - 10%. 
 
 Dependent Variable:  Credit Risk   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size -0.0044*** 
(-4.9903) 
-0.0049*** 
(-5.6263) 
-0.0044*** 
(-4.9854) 
-0.0049*** 
(-5.6247) 
-0.0039*** 
(-4.2353) 
-0.0046*** 
(-5.1500) 
Outsiders   -0.0033 
(-1.4054) 
-0.0021 
(-0.9293) 
  
Insiders     0.0075 
(1.4842) 
0.0045 
(0.9438) 
Log Total Assets 0.0007*** 
(4.1237) 
0.0007*** 
(4.0332) 
0.0007*** 
(4.1403) 
0.0007*** 
(3.9817) 
0.0007*** 
(4.2041) 
0.0007*** 
(4.0034) 
CEO Power 0.0003 
(0.5619) 
0.0000 
(-0.0030) 
0.0004 
(0.7167) 
0.0000 
(0.0297) 
0.0002 
(0.3281) 
-0.0001 
(-0.2209) 
CEO Tenure -0.0001*** 
(-3.1607) 
 -0.0001*** 
(-3.5801) 
 -0.0001*** 
(-3.2773) 
 
BOD Tenure  -0.0003*** 
(-3.6212) 
 -0.0003*** 
(-3.8621) 
 -0.0003*** 
(-3.6708) 
Crisis 0.0854** 
(2.0352) 
0.0992** 
(2.1828) 
0.1703** 
(2.4281) 
0.2027** 
(2.3754) 
0.0580 
(1.2471) 
0.0641 
(1.3676) 
Log Board Size * Crisis -0.0629** 
(-2.1368) 
-0.0619** 
(-2.0461) 
-0.0732** 
(-2.2356) 
-0.0742** 
(-2.1564) 
-0.0595** 
(-2.0112) 
-0.0577* 
(-1.9568) 
Outsiders * Crisis   -0.0939* 
(-1.8380) 
-0.1110* 
(-1.8053) 
  
Insiders * Crisis     0.1047 
(1.5055) 
0.1286 
(1.9225) 
Log Total Assets * Crisis 0.0057 
(1.5687) 
0.0046 
(1.5759) 
0.0069* 
(1.6905) 
0.0062* 
(1.7579) 
0.0062* 
(1.7125) 
0.0054* 
(1.7930) 
CEO Power * Crisis -0.0065 
(-0.3917) 
0.0016 
(0.1644) 
-0.0038 
(-0.2520) 
0.0027 
(0.2937) 
-0.0077 
(-0.4622) 
-0.0009 
(-0.0905) 
CEO Tenure * Crisis 0.0011 
(0.9463) 
 0.0008 
(0.8018) 
 0.0010 
(0.8215) 
 
BOD Tenure * Crisis  0.0009 
(0.4621) 
 0.0000 
(-0.0094) 
 0.0007 
(0.3629) 
Constant 0.0099*** 
(3.4762) 
0.0134*** 
(4.1160) 
0.0121*** 
(3.8831) 
0.0148*** 
(4.3976) 
0.0074** 
(2.1059) 
0.0118*** 
(3.0339) 
Sample Size 1123 1123 1123 1123 1123 1123 
F-Statistic 52.4699 48.0407 49.1220 47.4172 45.1443 42.3227 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.2979 0.2798 0.3272 0.3195 0.3089 0.2953 
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Table 11 
OLS Regressions on Liquidity Risk Including Crisis Dummy 
  
Table 11 shows OLS regressions of liquidity risk on the log of board size and asset size and board characteristics 
when we include a dummy for the recent financial crisis.  We do this to determine if there was a significant change 
in our results due to the financial crisis.  Liquidity risk is measured as the ratio of core deposits to total assets.  CEO 
Power is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO 
tenure is the number of years the CEO has been on the board of directors.  BOD Tenure is the average number of 
years the board members have been on the board of directors.  The tenure of each director is calculated and then an 
average is taken of all of the directors.  A board member is defined as an insider if he is an employee of the bank.  
Outsiders are classified as those board members that are not insiders, not formerly employed by the bank and not 
relatives of those that are currently employed by the bank.  Columns vary by the regressors they include.  
Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% (*) - 10%. 
 
 Dependent Variable:  Liquidity Risk   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size 0.0561*** 
(5.5387) 
0.0557*** 
(5.3496) 
0.0562*** 
(5.5455) 
0.0557*** 
(5.3313) 
0.0474*** 
(4.6705) 
0.0497*** 
(4.7848) 
Outsiders   0.0310 
(1.1367) 
0.0043 
(0.1617) 
  
Insiders     -0.1449*** 
(-2.6533) 
-0.1001* 
(-1.8886) 
Log Total Assets -0.0387*** 
(-19.7486) 
-0.0391*** 
(-20.0809) 
-0.0390*** 
(-19.7733) 
-0.0392*** 
(-19.7922) 
-0.0394*** 
(-19.8044) 
-0.0397*** 
(-19.9669) 
CEO Power -0.0193*** 
(-3.0082) 
-0.0128** 
(-2.0859) 
-0.0201*** 
(-3.0682) 
-0.0128** 
(-2.0815) 
-0.0169*** 
(-2.6392) 
-0.0102* 
(-1.6747) 
CEO Tenure 0.0011*** 
(3.2515) 
 0.0013*** 
(3.4289) 
 0.0014*** 
(3.8807) 
 
BOD Tenure  -0.0004 
(-0.3639) 
 -0.0004 
(-0.3400) 
 -0.0003 
(-0.2926) 
Crisis 0.1318 
(1.0498) 
0.1140 
(0.8478) 
0.2888* 
(1.6637) 
0.2573 
(1.4155) 
-0.0149 
(-0.1159) 
-0.0184 
(-0.1362) 
Log Board Size * Crisis -0.1035** 
(-2.3453) 
-0.1033** 
(-2.3457) 
-0.1197** 
(-2.4795) 
-0.1198** 
(-2.4852) 
-0.0820** 
(-2.1506) 
-0.0854** 
(-2.2505) 
Outsiders * Crisis   -0.1831* 
(-1.7517) 
-0.1554 
(-1.4782) 
  
Insiders * Crisis     0.5118** 
(2.1479) 
0.4534* 
(1.9292) 
Log Total Assets * Crisis 0.0089 
(1.5457) 
0.0096* 
(1.7251) 
0.0110* 
(1.8065) 
0.0118* 
(1.9432) 
0.0114* 
(1.8846) 
0.0122** 
(2.0583) 
CEO Power * Crisis 0.0427** 
(2.0469) 
0.0336* 
(1.8440) 
0.0479** 
(2.2602) 
0.0350* 
(1.9300) 
0.0361* 
(1.7452) 
0.0241 
(1.3807) 
CEO Tenure * Crisis -0.0016 
(-1.4671) 
 -0.0022** 
(-2.0274) 
 -0.0023** 
(-1.9949) 
 
BOD Tenure * Crisis  -0.0008 
(-0.2411) 
 -0.0021 
(-0.6376) 
 -0.0014 
(-0.4393) 
Constant 0.6695*** 
(18.1147) 
0.6921*** 
(16.7051) 
0.6487*** 
(15.2947) 
0.6892*** 
(14.9711) 
0.7180*** 
(17.7636) 
0.7272*** 
(16.2563) 
Sample Size 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
F-Statistic 44.6106 43.1156 37.2421 35.8411 38.4655 36.6681 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.2649 0.2583 0.2692 0.2617 0.2756 0.26618 
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Table 12 
OLS Regressions on Capital Ratio Including Crisis Dummy 
  
Table 12 shows OLS regressions of capital ratio on the log of board size and asset size and board characteristics 
when we include a dummy for the recent financial crisis.  We do this to determine if there was a significant change 
in our results due to the financial crisis.  The capital ratio is the ratio of total equity to total assets.  CEO Power is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO tenure is the 
number of years the CEO has been on the board of directors.  BOD Tenure is the average number of years the board 
members have been on the board of directors.  The tenure of each director is calculated and then an average is taken 
of all of the directors.  A board member is defined as an insider if he is an employee of the bank.  Outsiders are 
classified as those board members that are not insiders, not formerly employed by the bank and not relatives of those 
that are currently employed by the bank.  Columns vary by the regressors they include.  Significance levels:  (***) - 
1% (**) - 5% (*) - 10%. 
 
 Dependent Variable:  Capital Ratio   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size 0.0058** 
(2.1180) 
0.0057** 
(1.9705) 
0.0058** 
(2.1091) 
0.0057* 
(1.9417) 
0.0037 
(1.2966) 
0.0041 
(1.3292) 
Outsiders   -0.0063 
(-1.1387) 
-0.0092* 
(-1.6670) 
  
Insiders     -0.0346*** 
(-3.4990) 
-0.0280*** 
(-2.8835) 
Log Total Assets -0.0002 
(-0.3257) 
-0.0002 
(-0.4571) 
-0.0001 
(-0.2004) 
-0.0001 
(-0.2601) 
-0.0003 
(-0.6818) 
-0.0004 
(-0.7576) 
CEO Power -0.0010*** 
(-7.2855) 
-0.0091*** 
(-6.8016) 
-0.0098*** 
(-7.1026) 
-0.0090*** 
(-6.7403) 
-0.0094*** 
(-6.9380) 
-0.0084*** 
(-6.3222) 
CEO Tenure 0.0002 
(1.5887) 
 0.0001 
(1.3551) 
 0.0002** 
(2.1580) 
 
BOD Tenure  0.0000 
(-0.2538) 
 -0.0001 
(-0.4333) 
 0.0000 
(-0.1831) 
Crisis -0.0351 
(-1.2937) 
-0.0375 
(-1.2627) 
-0.0681** 
(-2.2132) 
-0.0739** 
(-2.1853) 
-0.0275 
(-0.9072) 
-0.0276 
(-0.8408) 
Log Board Size * Crisis 0.0098 
(1.0461) 
0.0098 
(1.0398) 
0.0133 
(1.3805) 
0.0134 
(1.3771) 
0.0094 
(1.0266) 
0.0091 
(0.9896) 
Outsiders * Crisis   0.0385** 
(2.0841) 
0.0415** 
(2.2186) 
  
Insiders * Crisis     -0.0370 
(-1.0301) 
-0.0433 
(-1.2134) 
Log Total Assets * Crisis 0.0009 
(0.7324) 
0.0011 
(0.8507) 
0.0005 
(0.3680) 
0.0005 
(0.3894) 
0.0008 
(0.5956) 
0.0008 
(0.6312) 
CEO Power * Crisis 0.0106** 
(2.3609) 
0.0092** 
(2.2382) 
0.0095** 
(2.1798) 
0.0088** 
(2.2028) 
0.0109** 
(2.3994) 
0.0099** 
(2.4126) 
CEO Tenure * Crisis -0.0003 
(-0.9552) 
 -0.0001 
(-0.4346) 
 -0.0002 
(-0.8245) 
 
BOD Tenure * Crisis  -0.0002 
(-0.2297) 
 0.0002 
(0.2297) 
 0.0000 
(-0.1013) 
Constant 0.0798*** 
(6.3289) 
0.0831*** 
(5.7516) 
0.0840*** 
(6.9886) 
0.0895*** 
(6.5843) 
0.0914*** 
(6.8113) 
0.0928*** 
(5.9399) 
Sample Size 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
F-Statistic 8.0090 7.6703 7.0048 6.8439 7.7898 7.2829 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.0608 0.0584 0.0648 0.0634 0.0715 0.0672 
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Table 13 
OLS Regressions on Operational Risk Including Crisis Dummy 
  
Table 13 shows OLS regressions of operational risk on the log of board size and asset size and board characteristics 
when we include a dummy for the recent financial crisis.  We do this to determine if there was a significant change 
in our results due to the financial crisis.  Operational risk is measured by the ratio of personal expenses to the 
number of employees.  Personal expenses include all salaries and benefits paid to employees of the bank.  CEO 
Power is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO 
tenure is the number of years the CEO has been on the board of directors.  BOD Tenure is the average number of 
years the board members have been on the board of directors.  The tenure of each director is calculated and then an 
average is taken of all of the directors.  A board member is defined as an insider if he is an employee of the bank.  
Outsiders are classified as those board members that are not insiders, not formerly employed by the bank and not 
relatives of those that are currently employed by the bank.  Columns vary by the regressors they include.  
Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% (*) - 10%. 
 
 Dependent Variable:  Operational Risk   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size -7.7385*** 
(-3.7652) 
-8.1714*** 
(-3.8270) 
-7.7032*** 
(-3.8632) 
-7.9378*** 
(-3.7725) 
-8.6757*** 
(-4.3418) 
-9.2430*** 
(-4.3590) 
Outsiders   25.0213*** 
(4.7277) 
24.9613*** 
(4.7867) 
  
Insiders     -15.4798 
(-1.5944) 
-18.0508* 
(-1.8805) 
Log Total Assets 5.4778*** 
(13.9206) 
5.4821*** 
(13.9495) 
5.2466*** 
(13.0956) 
5.2339*** 
(13.0903) 
5.3996*** 
(13.5203) 
5.3820*** 
(13.4761) 
CEO Power -2.2166* 
(-1.7893) 
-2.6589** 
(-2.3280) 
-2.8415** 
(-2.2538) 
-2.8498** 
(-2.4683) 
-1.9551 
(-1.5917) 
-2.2038* 
(-1.9405) 
CEO Tenure -0.1217* 
(-1.8485) 
 -0.0243 
(-0.3791) 
 -0.0967 
(-1.4918) 
 
BOD Tenure  -0.2845 
(-1.2688) 
 -0.1559 
(-0.7287) 
 -0.0272 
(-1.2252) 
Crisis -23.1929 
(-1.1055) 
-22.6242 
(-1.0654) 
-47.7160* 
(-1.6840) 
-45.9055* 
(-1.6948) 
-21.9948 
(-1.0440) 
-23.1120 
(-1.0619) 
Log Board Size * Crisis 13.8154** 
(2.4377) 
14.2671** 
(2.5329) 
18.6799*** 
(3.4837) 
18.7895*** 
(3.5961) 
13.9284** 
(2.4572) 
14.6297*** 
(2.6072) 
Outsiders * Crisis   21.0831 
(1.4489) 
18.7113 
(1.3891) 
  
Insiders * Crisis     -8.4031 
(-0.3461) 
-2.9425 
(-0.1226) 
Log Total Assets * Crisis 0.0230 
(0.0163) 
-0.0913 
(-0.0667) 
-0.3022 
(-0.2233) 
-0.4576 
(-0.3449) 
-0.0150 
(-0.0106) 
-0.1158 
(-0.0842) 
CEO Power * Crisis -6.0971 
(-1.3976) 
-4.9697 
(-1.3271) 
-6.8191 
(-1.5969) 
-5.1881 
(-1.4201) 
-6.0885 
(-1.4071) 
-5.0103 
(-1.3481) 
CEO Tenure * Crisis 0.1926 
(1.0143) 
 0.2521 
(1.3046) 
 0.1963 
(1.0101) 
 
BOD Tenure * Crisis  0.1900 
(0.4051) 
 0.4279 
(0.9454) 
 0.2093 
(0.4517) 
Constant -8.3820 
(-1.1545) 
-5.8119 
(-0.6808) 
-25.1410*** 
(-3.1973) 
-23.0676*** 
(-2.6064) 
-3.1942 
(-0.4164) 
0.4705 
(0.0512) 
Sample Size 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
F-Statistic 29.3999 29.2645 28.1321 28.0334 24.3845 24.3677 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.1919 0.1912 0.2177 0.2171 0.1943 0.1942 
 
  
63 
 
Table 14 
OLS Regressions on Beta M Including Crisis Dummy 
  
Table 14 shows OLS regressions of beta m on the log of board size and asset size and board characteristics when we 
include a dummy for the recent financial crisis.  We do this to determine if there was a significant change in our 
results due to the financial crisis.  Using the two-index model from Chen et al. (2006) and Anderson and Fraser 
(2000), we  estimate each year for each bank:  Rit = αi + β1i Rmt +  β2i INTERESTt + εit Where i and t denote bank i 
and time t respectively, R is the bank’s equity return, Rm is the return on the S&P 500 market index; INTEREST is 
the yield on the three-month Treasury bill rate; α is the intercept term; ε is the residuals; β1i is the systemic risk of 
bank i (this is what we call Beta M and use as the dependent variable in these models);  while idiosyncratic risk is 
the standard deviation of the residuals for each year.  CEO Power is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the 
CEO is also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has been on the board 
of directors.  BOD Tenure is the average number of years the board members have been on the board of directors.  
The tenure of each director is calculated and then an average is taken of all of the directors.  A board member is 
defined as an insider if he is an employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as those board members that are not 
insiders, not formerly employed by the bank and not relatives of those that are currently employed by the bank.    
Columns vary by the regressors they include.  Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% (*) - 10%. 
 Dependent Variable:  Beta M   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size -0.2348*** 
(-4.3841) 
-0.2327*** 
(-4.2833) 
-0.2344*** 
(-4.3693) 
-0.2294*** 
(-4.2093) 
-0.2803*** 
(-4.8801) 
-0.2704*** 
(-4.8533) 
Outsiders   0.3152** 
(2.0585) 
0.3516** 
(2.4197) 
  
Insiders     -0.5848* 
(-1.9569) 
-0.6361** 
(-2.1722) 
Log Total Assets 0.0325*** 
(2.7542) 
0.0337*** 
(2.8395) 
0.0296** 
(2.4567) 
0.0302** 
(2.4947) 
0.0296** 
(2.4772) 
0.0301** 
(2.5133) 
CEO Power -0.0033 
(-0.0927) 
-0.0180 
(-0.4978) 
-0.0112 
(-0.3094) 
-0.0207 
(-0.5732) 
0.0065 
(0.1830) 
-0.0020 
(-0.0555) 
CEO Tenure -0.0024 
(-1.2396) 
 -0.0012 
(-0.5795) 
 -0.0015 
(-0.7477) 
 
BOD Tenure  0.0016 
(0.2825) 
 0.0034 
(0.6093) 
 0.0020 
(0.3658) 
Crisis -0.5340 
(-0.8881) 
-0.4324 
(-0.6661) 
-0.2241 
(-0.3482) 
-0.1062 
(-0.1517) 
-0.7795 
(-1.1958) 
-0.6779 
(-0.9744) 
Log Board Size * Crisis 0.0163 
(0.0971) 
0.0094 
(0.0557) 
0.0041 
(0.0249) 
-0.0037 
(-0.0220) 
0.0581 
(0.3304) 
0.0501 
(0.2853) 
Outsiders * Crisis   -0.4255 
(-1.1816) 
-0.4412 
(-1.2404) 
  
Insiders * Crisis     0.7700 
(1.1838) 
0.7236 
(1.1419) 
Log Total Assets * Crisis 0.0705** 
(2.1710) 
0.0735** 
(2.2650) 
0.0748** 
(2.2784) 
0.0783** 
(2.3855) 
0.0744** 
(2.2900) 
0.0776** 
(2.3904) 
CEO Power * Crisis 0.0802 
(0.8829) 
0.0561 
(0.6524) 
0.0912 
(0.9928) 
0.0596 
(0.6914) 
0.0682 
(0.7474) 
0.0384 
(0.4399) 
CEO Tenure * Crisis -0.0040 
(-0.8126) 
 -0.0056 
(-1.0863) 
 -0.0051 
(-1.0281) 
 
BOD Tenure * Crisis  -0.0159 
(-1.1705) 
 -0.0185 
(-1.3148) 
 -0.0165 
(-1.2106) 
Constant 1.0921*** 
(5.2878) 
1.0320*** 
(4.5235) 
0.8810*** 
(3.9491) 
0.7890*** 
(3.2396) 
1.2881*** 
(5.6136) 
1.2534*** 
(5.0583) 
Sample Size 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
F-Statistic 33.6202 33.3550 27.9990 27.9502 27.9612 27.8582 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.2136 0.2123 0.2169 0.2166 0.2167 0.2160 
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Table 15 
OLS Regressions on Idiosyncratic Risk Including Crisis Dummy 
Table 15 shows OLS regressions of idiosyncratic risk on the log of board size and asset size and board 
characteristics when we include a dummy for the recent financial crisis.  We do this to determine if there was a 
significant change in our results due to the financial crisis.  Using the two-index model from Chen et al. (2006) and 
Anderson and Fraser (2000), we  estimate each year for each bank:  Rit = αi + β1i Rmt +  β2i INTERESTt + εit Where i 
and t denote bank i and time t respectively, R is the bank’s equity return, Rm is the return on the S&P 500 market 
index; INTEREST is the yield on the three-month Treasury bill rate; α is the intercept term; ε is the residuals; β1i is 
the systemic risk of bank i (this is what we call Beta M and use as the dependent variable in these models);  while 
idiosyncratic risk is the standard deviation of the residuals for each year.  CEO Power is a dummy variable that takes 
a value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has 
been on the board of directors.  BOD Tenure is the average number of years the board members have been on the 
board of directors.  The tenure of each director is calculated and then an average is taken of all of the directors.  A 
board member is defined as an insider if he is an employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as those board 
members that are not insiders, not formerly employed by the bank and not relatives of those that are currently 
employed by the bank.    Columns vary by the regressors they include.  Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% 
(*) - 10%. 
 Dependent Variable:  Idiosyncratic Risk   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size 0.0000 
(-0.5752) 
0.0000 
(-0.8892) 
0.0000 
(-0.6036) 
0.0000 
(-0.9879) 
0.0000 
(1.5233) 
0.0000 
(1.0261) 
Outsiders   -0.0004*** 
(-3.3608) 
-0.0004*** 
(-3.4440) 
  
Insiders     0.0013*** 
(5.0942) 
0.0012*** 
(4.9199) 
Log Total Assets 0.0000*** 
(-6.2710) 
0.0000*** 
(-6.4138) 
0.0000*** 
(-5.7351) 
0.0000*** 
(-5.8320) 
0.0000*** 
(-5.3464) 
0.0000*** 
(-5.4130) 
CEO Power 0.0000 
(-0.5417) 
0.0000 
(-0.4671) 
0.0000 
(-0.1217) 
0.0000 
(-0.3412) 
0.0000 
(-1.5585) 
0.0000* 
(-1.8896) 
CEO Tenure 0.0000 
(-0.8346) 
 0.0000** 
(-2.0091) 
 0.0000*** 
(-2.7762) 
 
BOD Tenure  0.0000** 
(-2.2370) 
 0.0000*** 
(-2.7579) 
 0.0000 
(-2.5630) 
Crisis 0.0017 
(0.8550) 
0.0021 
(0.9524) 
0.0034 
(1.2939) 
0.0041 
(1.4294) 
0.0014 
(0.6522) 
0.0017 
(0.7250) 
Log Board Size * Crisis -0.0018*** 
(-2.6019) 
-0.0018** 
(-2.5584) 
-0.0020*** 
(-2.7282) 
-0.0020*** 
(-2.7267) 
-0.0017*** 
(-2.7682) 
-0.0017*** 
(-2.7219) 
Outsiders * Crisis   -0.0018 
(-1.0659) 
-0.0020 
(-1.2096) 
  
Insiders * Crisis     0.0014 
(0.3945) 
0.0017 
(0.4603) 
Log Total Assets * Crisis 0.0003** 
(2.5645) 
0.0002** 
(2.4697) 
0.0003*** 
(2.6471) 
0.0003*** 
(2.6179) 
0.0003** 
(2.4989) 
0.0003** 
(2.4239) 
CEO Power * Crisis 0.0002 
(0.7364) 
0.0003 
(0.9524) 
0.0003 
(0.9145) 
0.0003 
(1.0265) 
0.0002 
(0.6974) 
0.0003 
(0.8484) 
CEO Tenure * Crisis 0.0000 
(0.1996) 
 0.0000 
(-0.1372) 
 0.0000 
(0.1279) 
 
BOD Tenure * Crisis  0.0000 
(-0.4156) 
 0.0000 
(-0.7983) 
 0.0000 
(-0.4940) 
Constant 0.0012*** 
(10.4018) 
0.0013*** 
(10.6861) 
0.0014*** 
(9.8769) 
0.0015*** 
(10.3181) 
0.0008*** 
(6.1487) 
0.0009*** 
(6.4235) 
Sample Size 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
F-Statistic 76.5461 77.0900 65.2751 66.3538 64.8517 65.3544 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.3821 0.3838 0.3924 0.3963 0.3908 0.3926 
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Table 16 
OLS Regressions on Standard Deviation Including Crisis Dummy 
  
Table 16 shows OLS regressions of standard deviation on the log of board size and asset size and board 
characteristics when we include a dummy for the recent financial crisis.  We do this to determine if there was a 
significant change in our results due to the financial crisis.  Standard deviation is the standard deviation of the 
banks’ daily stock returns.  CEO Power is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of 
the Board of Directors.  CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has been on the board of directors.  BOD 
Tenure is the average number of years the board members have been on the board of directors.  The tenure of each 
director is calculated and then an average is taken of all of the directors.  A board member is defined as an insider if 
he is an employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as those board members that are not insiders, not formerly 
employed by the bank and not relatives of those that are currently employed by the bank.    Columns vary by the 
regressors they include.  Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% (*) - 10%. 
 
 Dependent Variable:  Standard Deviation   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size -0.0009 
(-1.1058) 
-0.0011 
(-1.4233) 
-0.0009 
(-1.1436) 
-0.0012 
(-1.5180) 
0.0008 
(1.1337) 
0.0004 
(0.5909) 
Outsiders   -0.0065*** 
(-3.0047) 
-0.0062*** 
(-2.9823) 
  
Insiders     0.0283*** 
(6.1969) 
0.0264*** 
(5.9194) 
Log Total Assets -0.0012*** 
(-6.8501) 
-0.0012*** 
(-6.9658) 
-0.0011*** 
(-6.4008) 
-0.0011*** 
(-6.4922) 
-0.0010*** 
(-5.9487) 
-0.0011*** 
(-6.0135) 
CEO Power -0.0003 
(-0.6372) 
-0.0003 
(-0.6796) 
-0.0002 
(-0.2991) 
-0.0003 
(-0.5780) 
-0.0008 
(-1.6171) 
-0.0010** 
(-2.0468) 
CEO Tenure 0.0000 
(-1.0735) 
 0.0000** 
(-1.9711) 
 0.0000*** 
(-2.8842) 
 
BOD Tenure  -0.0002** 
(-2.2921) 
 -0.0002*** 
(-2.7357) 
 -0.0002*** 
(-2.6474) 
Crisis 0.0013 
(0.0676) 
0.0044 
(0.2070) 
0.0123 
(0.5166) 
0.0183 
(0.7015) 
0.0049 
(0.2268) 
0.0073 
(0.3178) 
Log Board Size * Crisis -0.0155** 
(-2.5003) 
-0.0153** 
(-2.4443) 
-0.0173*** 
(-2.7041) 
-0.0174*** 
(-2.6758) 
-0.0164*** 
(-2.6800) 
-0.0161*** 
(-2.6149) 
Outsiders * Crisis   -0.0106 
(-0.7503) 
-0.0134 
(-0.9286) 
  
Insiders * Crisis     -0.0061 
(-0.2193) 
-0.0035 
(-0.1296) 
Log Total Assets * Crisis 0.0043*** 
(4.1000) 
0.0042*** 
(4.0626) 
0.0044*** 
(4.1594) 
0.0044*** 
(4.1912) 
0.0042*** 
(3.9944) 
0.0042*** 
(3.9789) 
CEO Power * Crisis 0.0027 
(0.8311) 
0.0028 
(0.9343) 
0.0031 
(0.9469) 
0.0029 
(0.9867) 
0.0030 
(0.8865) 
0.0030 
(0.9812) 
CEO Tenure * Crisis 0.0000 
(-0.1126) 
 0.0000 
(-0.2880) 
 0.0000 
(-0.0091) 
 
BOD Tenure * Crisis  -0.0003 
(-0.5978) 
 -0.0004 
(-0.8367) 
 -0.0003 
(-0.6288) 
Constant 0.0407*** 
(14.7937) 
0.0429*** 
(14.7082) 
0.0451*** 
(14.0656) 
0.0472*** 
(14.1167) 
0.0312*** 
(10.2780) 
0.0337*** 
(10.4351) 
Sample Size 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
F-Statistic 212.3694 214.2854 176.4973 178.5610 181.7410 182.7847 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.6318 0.6339 0.6358 0.6385 0.6426 0.6439 
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Appendix - Table 1 
OLS Regressions on Credit Risk 
  
Table 1 shows OLS regressions of credit risk on the log of board size and asset size and board characteristics.  We 
proxy credit risk by calculating the noncurrent loan ratio, which is the ratio of noncurrent loans to total loans and 
leases.  Noncurrent loans is the sum of loans that are more than 90 days past due and those that are not accruing 
interest.  CEO Power is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board of 
Directors.  CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has been on the board of directors.  BOD Tenure is the 
average number of years the board members have been on the board of directors.  The tenure of each director is 
calculated and then an average is taken of all of the directors.  A board member is defined as an insider if he is an 
employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as those board members that are not insiders, not formerly employed 
by the bank and not relatives of those that are currently employed by the bank.    Columns vary by the regressors they 
include.  Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% (*) - 10%. 
 
 Dependent Variable:  Credit Risk   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size -0.0125*** 
(-3.4269) 
-0.0125*** 
(-3.8117) 
-0.0126*** 
(-3.3970) 
-0.0127*** 
(-3.7107) 
-0.0120*** 
(-3.0695) 
-0.0119*** 
(-3.6923) 
Outsiders   -0.0073 
(-1.0255) 
-0.0075 
(-0.8757) 
  
Insiders     0.0093 
(0.5617) 
0.0098 
(0.6670) 
Log Total Assets 0.0019*** 
(3.3703) 
0.0019*** 
(3.5690) 
0.0020*** 
(3.2649) 
0.0019*** 
(3.3342) 
0.0019*** 
(3.5119) 
0.0019*** 
(3.5915) 
CEO Power -0.0008 
(-0.2936) 
-0.0001 
(-0.3090) 
-0.0001 
(-0.2286) 
-0.0005 
(-0.2834) 
-0.0009 
(-0.3672) 
-0.0008 
(-0.4547) 
CEO Tenure 0.0000 
(0.1621) 
 0.0000 
(0.0216) 
 0.0000 
(0.0841) 
 
BOD Tenure  0.0000 
(-0.0130) 
 0.0000 
(-0.1417) 
 0.0000 
(-0.0344) 
Constant 0.0149** 
(2.3709) 
0.0155** 
(2.1852) 
0.0200** 
(2.3223) 
0.0209** 
(2.3089) 
0.0119 
(1.4919) 
0.0122 
(1.5058) 
Sample Size 1123 1123 1123 1123 1123 1123 
F-Statistic 8.6003 8.5624 7.1575 7.1660 6.9982 6.9902 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.0299 0.0297 0.0310 0.0311 0.0303 0.0303 
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Appendix - Table 2 
OLS Regressions on Liquidity Risk 
  
Table 2 shows OLS regressions of liquidity risk on the log of board size and asset size and board characteristics.  
Liquidity risk is measured as the ratio of core deposits to total assets.  CEO Power is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has 
been on the board of directors.  BOD Tenure is the average number of years the board members have been on the 
board of directors.  The tenure of each director is calculated and then an average is taken of all of the directors.  A 
board member is defined as an insider if he is an employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as those board 
members that are not insiders, not formerly employed by the bank and not relatives of those that are currently 
employed by the bank.    Columns vary by the regressors they include.  Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% (*) 
- 10%. 
 
 Dependent Variable:  Liquidity Risk   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size 0.0444*** 
(4.3332) 
0.0440*** 
(4.1902) 
0.0447*** 
(4.3183) 
0.0439*** 
(4.1208) 
0.0396*** 
(4.0302) 
0.0411*** 
(4.0813) 
Outsiders   0.0149 
(0.5406) 
-0.0061 
(-0.2254) 
  
Insiders     -0.0843 
(-1.3614) 
-0.0517 
(-0.8515) 
Log Total Assets -0.03699*** 
(-19.9839) 
-0.0375*** 
(-20.3828) 
-0.0371*** 
(-19.7115) 
-0.0375*** 
(-19.8167) 
-0.0374*** 
(-19.5780) 
-0.0378*** 
(-19.7882) 
CEO Power -0.0139** 
(-2.2416) 
-0.0082 
(-1.4081) 
-0.0143** 
(-2.2512) 
-0.0081 
(-1.3926) 
-0.0125** 
(-2.0508) 
-0.0069 
(-1.2098) 
CEO Tenure 0.0009*** 
(2.6529) 
 0.0001*** 
(2.7196) 
 0.0010*** 
(3.0112) 
 
BOD Tenure  -0.0004 
(-0.4443) 
 -0.0004 
(-0.4770) 
 -0.0004 
(-0.3995) 
Constant 0.6754*** 
(19.1296) 
0.6969*** 
(17.6419) 
0.6651*** 
(15.8996) 
0.7012*** 
(15.4699) 
0.7031*** 
(18.1057) 
0.7145*** 
(16.7722) 
Sample Size 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
F-Statistic 92.0990 89.7624 73.7080 71.7623 74.4338 72.0645 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.2477 0.2429 0.2479 0.2430 0.2497 0.2437 
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Appendix - Table 3 
OLS Regressions on Capital Ratio 
   
Table 3 shows OLS regressions of capital ratio on the log of board size and asset size and board characteristics.  The 
capital ratio is the ratio of total equity to total assets.  CEO Power is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the 
CEO is also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has been on the board 
of directors.  BOD Tenure is the average number of years the board members have been on the board of directors.  
The tenure of each director is calculated and then an average is taken of all of the directors.  A board member is 
defined as an insider if he is an employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as those board members that are not 
insiders, not formerly employed by the bank and not relatives of those that are currently employed by the bank.    
Columns vary by the regressors they include.  Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% (*) - 10%. 
 
 Dependent Variable:  Capital Ratio   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size 0.0060** 
(2.2756) 
0.0060** 
(2.1827) 
0.0060** 
(2.2803) 
0.0059** 
(2.1716) 
0.0036 
(1.3147) 
0.0040 
(1.3847) 
Outsiders   -0.0004 
(-0.0792) 
-0.0027 
(-0.5140) 
  
Insiders     -0.0415*** 
(-4.1965) 
-0.0361*** 
(-3.7250) 
Log Total Assets 0.0002 
(0.4271) 
0.0001 
(0.3021) 
0.0002 
(0.4230) 
0.0002 
(0.3522) 
0.0001 
(-0.0288) 
-0.0006 
(-0.1476) 
CEO Power -0.0086*** 
(-6.4573) 
-0.0079*** 
(-6.1880) 
-0.0086*** 
(-6.4951) 
-0.0079*** 
(-6.1663) 
-0.0079*** 
(-5.9945) 
-0.0070*** 
(-5.4915) 
CEO Tenure 0.0001 
(1.2574) 
 0.0001 
(1.2518) 
 0.0002* 
(1.9609) 
 
BOD Tenure  0.0000 
(-0.0421) 
 0.0000 
(-0.1042) 
 0.0001 
(0.0729) 
Constant 0.0746*** 
(6.4817) 
0.0766*** 
(5.8960) 
0.0749*** 
(6.7001) 
0.0786*** 
(6.3090) 
0.0882*** 
(7.1677) 
0.0889*** 
(6.3208) 
Sample Size 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
F-Statistic 9.6608 9.1823 7.7227 7.3821 10.3009 9.3760 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.0334 0.0318 0.0334 0.0320 0.0440 0.0402 
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Appendix - Table 4 
OLS Regressions on Operational Risk 
  
Table 4 shows OLS regressions of operational risk on the log of board size and asset size and board characteristics.  
Operational risk is measured by the ratio of personal expenses to the number of employees.  Personal expenses 
include all salaries and benefits paid to employees of the bank.  CEO Power is a dummy variable that takes a value of 
1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has been on the 
board of directors.  BOD Tenure is the average number of years the board members have been on the board of 
directors.  The tenure of each director is calculated and then an average is taken of all of the directors.  A board 
member is defined as an insider if he is an employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as those board members 
that are not insiders, not formerly employed by the bank and not relatives of those that are currently employed by the 
bank.    Columns vary by the regressors they include.  Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% (*) - 10%. 
 
 Dependent Variable:  Operational Risk   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size -7.2592*** 
(-3.7622) 
-7.4852*** 
(-3.7527) 
-6.9103*** 
(-3.6949) 
-6.8925*** 
(-3.5125) 
-8.3327*** 
(-4.4060) 
-8.6550*** 
(-4.3664) 
Outsiders   28.4075*** 
(5.6313) 
28.4492*** 
(5.7691) 
  
Insiders     -18.6433** 
(-2.0426) 
-20.8130** 
(-2.3084) 
Log Total Assets 5.7205*** 
(14.0306) 
5.7545*** 
(14.1874) 
5.4455*** 
(13.3329) 
5.4466*** 
(13.3958) 
5.6261*** 
(13.6910) 
5.6350*** 
(13.7596) 
CEO Power -3.2291** 
(-2.5512) 
-3.7530*** 
(-3.1959) 
-3.9537*** 
(-3.0820) 
-3.9618*** 
(-3.3693) 
-2.9299** 
(-2.3365) 
-3.2407*** 
(-2.7815) 
CEO Tenure -0.1083* 
(-1.7488) 
 0.0004 
(0.0059) 
 -0.0794 
(-1.2895) 
 
BOD Tenure  -0.1484 
(-0.7339) 
 0.01222 
(0.0632) 
 -0.1315 
(-0.6587) 
Constant -11.4397 
(-1.6190) 
-10.9630 
(-1.3628) 
-31.0856*** 
(-3.9072) 
-31.2924*** 
(-3.5976) 
-5.3242 
(-0.7208) 
-3.8613 
(-0.4512) 
Sample Size 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
F-Statistic 48.1112 47.5163 46.4276 46.4287 39.3591 39.1579 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.1467 0.1452 0.1719 0.1719 0.1497 0.1490 
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Appendix - Table 5 
OLS Regressions on Beta M 
  
Table 5 shows OLS regressions of Beta M on the log of board size and asset size and board characteristics.  Using 
the two-index model from Chen et al. (2006) and Anderson and Fraser (2000), we  estimate each year for each bank:  
Rit = αi + β1i Rmt +  β2i INTERESTt + εit Where i and t denote bank i and time t respectively, R is the bank’s equity 
return, Rm is the return on the S&P 500 market index; INTEREST is the yield on the three-month Treasury bill rate; 
α is the intercept term; ε is the residuals; β1i is the systemic risk of bank i (this is what we call Beta M and use as the 
dependent variable in these models);  while idiosyncratic risk is the standard deviation of the residuals for each year.  
CEO Power is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO 
tenure is the number of years the CEO has been on the board of directors.  BOD Tenure is the average number of 
years the board members have been on the board of directors.  The tenure of each director is calculated and then an 
average is taken of all of the directors.  A board member is defined as an insider if he is an employee of the bank.  
Outsiders are classified as those board members that are not insiders, not formerly employed by the bank and not 
relatives of those that are currently employed by the bank.    Columns vary by the regressors they include.  
Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% (*) - 10%. 
 
 Dependent Variable:  Beta M   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size -0.2865*** 
(-5.2644) 
-0.2809*** 
(-5.0739) 
-0.2822*** 
(-5.1890) 
-0.2721*** 
(-4.9106) 
-0.3237*** 
(-5.7131) 
-0.3227*** 
(-5.6389) 
Outsiders   0.3468** 
(2.2973) 
0.4222*** 
(2.9599) 
  
Insiders     -0.6469** 
(-2.1900) 
-0.7425** 
(-2.578) 
Log Total Assets 0.0571*** 
(4.2584) 
0.0596*** 
(4.4351) 
0.0537*** 
(3.9864) 
0.0551*** 
(4.0811) 
0.0538*** 
(4.0248) 
0.0554*** 
(4.1345) 
CEO Power -0.0035 
(-0.0967) 
-0.0294 
(-0.8133) 
-0.0123 
(-0.3392) 
-0.0325 
(-0.9033) 
0.0069 
(0.1917) 
-0.0111 
(-0.3094) 
CEO Tenure -0.0037* 
(-1.9022) 
 -0.0024 
(-1.1619) 
 -0.0027 
(-1.3628) 
 
BOD Tenure  0.0043 
(0.7625) 
 0.0067 
(1.1824) 
 0.0049 
(0.8710) 
Constant 0.9447*** 
(4.2865) 
0.8168*** 
(3.3996) 
0.7048*** 
(2.8970) 
0.5151** 
(1.9749) 
1.1569*** 
(4.8959) 
1.0702*** 
(4.2138) 
Sample Size 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
F-Statistic 10.3173 9.5727 9.3537 9.3839 9.2880 9.0850 
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.0356 0.0331 0.0402 0.0403 0.0399 0.0390 
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Appendix - Table 6 
OLS Regressions on Idiosyncratic Risk 
  
Table 6 shows OLS regressions of Beta M on the log of board size and asset size and board characteristics.  Using 
the two-index model from Chen et al. (2006) and Anderson and Fraser (2000), we  estimate each year for each bank:  
Rit = αi + β1i Rmt +  β2i INTERESTt + εit Where i and t denote bank i and time t respectively, R is the bank’s equity 
return, Rm is the return on the S&P 500 market index; INTEREST is the yield on the three-month Treasury bill rate; 
α is the intercept term; ε is the residuals; β1i is the systemic risk of bank i (this is what we call Beta M and use as the 
dependent variable in these models);  while idiosyncratic risk is the standard deviation of the residuals for each year.  
CEO Power is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO 
tenure is the number of years the CEO has been on the board of directors.  BOD Tenure is the average number of 
years the board members have been on the board of directors.  The tenure of each director is calculated and then an 
average is taken of all of the directors.  A board member is defined as an insider if he is an employee of the bank.  
Outsiders are classified as those board members that are not insiders, not formerly employed by the bank and not 
relatives of those that are currently employed by the bank.    Columns vary by the regressors they include.  
Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% (*) - 10%. 
 
 Dependent Variable:  Idiosyncratic Risk   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size -0.0003*** 
(-3.1773) 
-0.0003*** 
(-3.1511) 
-0.0003*** 
(-3.1848) 
-0.0003*** 
(-3.1461) 
-0.0003*** 
(-2.7266) 
-0.0003*** 
(-2.9705) 
Outsiders   -0.0003 
(-0.8317) 
-0.0002 
(-0.6851) 
  
Insiders     0.0009 
(1.2716) 
0.0000 
(-0.0911) 
Log Total Assets 0.0000 
(0.7459) 
0.0000 
(0.7826) 
0.0000 
(0.8406) 
0.0000 
(0.8646) 
0.0000 
(0.9224) 
0.0000 
(0.7740) 
CEO Power 0.0000 
(0.0116) 
0.0000 
(-0.1667) 
0.0000 
(0.1168) 
0.0000 
(-0.1422) 
0.0000 
(-0.2196) 
0.0000 
(-0.1840) 
CEO Tenure 0.0000 
(-0.5208) 
 0.0000 
(-0.7828) 
 0.0000 
(-0.8788) 
 
BOD Tenure  0.0000 
(-0.0268) 
 0.0000 
(-0.1425) 
 0.0000 
(-0.0136) 
Constant 0.0011*** 
(3.3275) 
0.0011*** 
(2.8324) 
0.0013*** 
(3.1519) 
0.0012*** 
(2.7410) 
0.0008** 
(2.0290) 
0.0011*** 
(2.8170) 
Sample Size 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
F-Statistic 2.9047 2.8256 2.5318 2.4005 3.0272 2.2602 
(P-Value) (0.0209) (0.0238) (0.0274) (0.0354) (0.0101) (0.0465) 
R-squared 0.0103 0.0100 0.0112 0.0106 0.0134 0.0100 
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Appendix - Table 7 
OLS Regressions on Standard Deviation 
  
Table 7 shows OLS regressions of standard deviation on the log of board size and asset size and board characteristics.  
Standard deviation is the standard deviation of the banks’ daily stock returns.  CEO Power is a dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board of Directors.  CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO 
has been on the board of directors.  BOD Tenure is the average number of years the board members have been on the 
board of directors.  The tenure of each director is calculated and then an average is taken of all of the directors.  A 
board member is defined as an insider if he is an employee of the bank.  Outsiders are classified as those board 
members that are not insiders, not formerly employed by the bank and not relatives of those that are currently 
employed by the bank.    Columns vary by the regressors they include.  Significance levels:  (***) - 1% (**) - 5% (*) 
- 10%. 
 
 Dependent Variable:  Standard Deviation   
Independent Variable I II III IV V VI 
Log Board Size -0.0050*** 
(-3.5771) 
-0.0049*** 
(-3.4439) 
-0.0050*** 
(-3.5910) 
-0.0049*** 
(-3.4439) 
-0.0040*** 
(-2.7414) 
-0.0041*** 
(-2.7869) 
Outsiders  -0.0005 
(-0.1286) 
-0.0021 
(-0.5024) 
-0.0005 
(-0.1259) 
  
Insiders     0.0175** 
(2.0092) 
0.0146* 
(1.7217) 
Log Total Assets 0.0001 
(0.2577) 
0.0001 
(0.3704) 
0.0001 
(0.3102) 
0.0001 
(0.3704) 
0.0002 
(0.4816) 
0.0002 
(0.5658) 
CEO Power -0.0004 
(-0.4544) 
-0.0009 
(-0.8990) 
-0.0004 
(-0.3978) 
-0.0009 
(-0.8990) 
-0.0007 
(-0.7345) 
-0.0012 
(-1.2539) 
CEO Tenure -0.0006 
(-1.1643) 
 -0.0007 
(-1.2722) 
 -0.0009 
(-1.5969) 
 
BOD Tenure  0.0003 
(0.2150) 
 0.0004 
(0.2150) 
 0.0003 
(0.1602) 
Constant 0.0361*** 
(6.3613) 
0.0348*** 
(4.8642) 
0.0375*** 
(5.6941) 
0.0348*** 
(4.8642) 
0.0303*** 
(4.8762) 
0.0294*** 
(4.3174) 
Sample Size 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 1124 
F-Statistic 3.5932 2.5944 2.9271 2.5944 3.8859 3.3267 
(P-Value) (0.0064) (0.0242) (0.0124) (0.0242) (0.0017) (0.0055) 
R-squared 0.0127 0.0115 0.0129 0.0115 0.0171 0.0147 
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